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Fig. 1. screenshot from ReART: The Starry Night (Part 2), robot art 2017,  
cMiT robotics, Kasetsart University.
ai (and) art: an introduction
The annual robot art competition launched by internet entrepreneur and dating-websites founder andrew conru invites ‘visually beau-
tiful’ paintings made by robots. The winners so far 
include a dot-painted portrait of albert einstein, a 
copy of The Starry Night by Vincent van Gogh that took 
a robot four hours and fifty minutes to produce (fig. 
1) and a series of pictures executed by a programme 
called cloudpainter. Written by pindar Van arman, 
cloudpainter enables a ‘style transfer’ from the work 
of an established artist, as a result of which we get pic-
tures which look like they could have been painted by 
cézanne or Francis Bacon, but it can also make its own 
stylistic interventions. in august 2017 Taryn southern, a 
self-defined ‘artist/futurist with more than 700 million 
online views’, launched a song from what she claimed 
would be the world’s first ai-composed music album.1 
having fed parameters such as mood, tempo and genre 
into the open source software called amper, southern 
then overlaid the ai-created instrumentation and chord 
structure with the lyrics and vocal melodies of her own. 
in July 2018 the electronics manufacturer huawei held 
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a photographic competition that was judged by pho-
tographer alex Lambrechts – and a huawei p20 pro ai 
smartphone. Building on its previous claims that the 
huawei p20 was equipped with ‘Master ai’ which auto-
matically set the most optimum camera mode for every 
situation as well as learning to adapt to user behav-
iour (huawei 2018), the chinese ‘ai-powered’ flagship 
was not just making photos but also evaluating them, 
‘using its artificial intelligence to rate thousands of 
images alongside a professional Leica photographer’.2 
This recent outpouring of computer-made creative 
artefacts has been taking place against the unfolding of 
public interest in artificial intelligence, from fascina-
tion with its creative capabilities to anxiety related to 
the impending automation of the labour force or even 
the possible annihilation of the human species. The 
stories and claims regarding (supposed) machinic cre-
ativity that accompany the emergence of those artefacts 
are at least as interesting as the artefacts themselves.
This short book discusses the relationship between 
artificial intelligence and art in a way that goes beyond 
the oft-posed question: ‘can computers be creative?’. 
an attempt to answer this question will nonetheless 
be made, together with demonstrating why this may 
not be the best question to ask about ai-driven art. along 
the way, i will formulate many alternative and largely 
open-ended questions, in an attempt to challenge the 
binary strictures of much of the current thinking on 
ai. Yet questioning will not be the only thing i’ll do. The 
book’s argument will take the form of a critique, but this 
ai (and) art: an introduction 13 
should not be treated as a technophobic rejection of ai 
art, or ai itself. on the contrary, i am deeply intrigued 
by the technical and cultural possibilities of ai, and by 
the claims and promises made in its name by develop-
ers, investors and commentators. But i want to offer a 
more nuanced position on understanding our relation-
ship with technology. instead of pitching the human 
against the machine, i propose to see different forms 
of human activity, including art, as having always been 
technical, and thus also, to some extent, artificially 
intelligent. My critique will primarily focus on the 
political underpinnings of the current ai debate and the 
way it feeds into art, although i will have some acerbic 
things to say about certain forms of ai-driven aesthet-
ics. The exploration of the issue of machine vision in 
current ai research will lead me to raise broader ques-
tions about different ways of seeing, (in)visibility and 
perception, across various platforms and scales. Last 
but not least, i will seek to recognise the potential of ai 
art for breaking the circuit of what philosopher Franco 
‘Bifo’ Berardi has called neurotalitarianism (2017) and 
for enabling a different form of psychopolitics.
AI Art has been shaped by a number of broader ques-
tions with regard to art, media and technology: is there 
an ontological difference between early computer-
generated art, net art and the more recent forms of 
ai-driven art? or is it just a difference of degree, i.e. of 
the mode and intensity of technological entanglement? 
should the recent applications of ai to image making 
and image curating encourage us to (re)turn to bigger 
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questions concerning the very purpose of artistic pro-
duction? What are art, photography and other forms 
of image making for? Who are they for? does art exist 
outside the clearly designated realm of human cultural 
practice? Will ai create new conditions and new audi-
ences for art? What will art ‘after’ ai look like? Who 
will be its recipient?
While the book’s argument may seem to be more 
explicitly focused on the question of production – the 
production of ai-driven art itself and the production 
of technological and conceptual frameworks for such 
art – the problem of art’s reception inevitably reoccurs 
throughout. indeed, AI Art ultimately considers the 
socio-political and psycho-political stakes of redesign-
ing the artistic apparatus, with all its production and 
display institutions – from art schools and artists’ stu-
dios through to galleries and festivals – for the public at 
large. in recognising that the reception of technological 
art, especially of the kind that uses or at least engages 
with al, requires some degree of technical compe-
tency, it asks what is being unveiled and obscured by 
the current artistic discourse around ai. Going beyond 
aesthetic experience and the sense of ‘fun’ that is often 
associated with technology-driven art, it considers art’s 
role in demystifying new technologies while highlight-
ing some socio-political issues – but it also explores the 
limitations of art as a debunker of techno-hype.
The very notion of ‘ai art’ posited in the book’s title is 
a proposition, not a typological designation. This is why 
i veer between the visually more straightforward ‘ai art’ 
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and the more descriptive and instrumental-sounding 
‘ai-driven art’. But my principal ambition is not to lock 
us to a definition but rather to stage a conceptual and 
disciplinary encounter between two concepts – ‘art’ and 
‘artificial intelligence’ – which themselves have rather 
fraught legacies and valences, and which both face 
uncertain yet intriguing futures. and thus i approach 
‘art’ from a post-art-historical position of media theory, 
building on discussions around conceptualism, tech-
nological practice, and social and institutional critique. 
The analysis of the technological aspect of art is an 
important factor in this framework, as is the recogni-
tion of the social and material conditions in which art 
is produced and recognised as art. This approach super-
sedes the analysis of the art object as a singular entity 
with a supposedly timeless value, with a more relational 
understanding of art’s production, reception and recog-
nition in specific socio-historical contexts. Questions of 
originality and of the genius of an individual producer 
are hence framed by a study of the wider context that 
produces conditions for the emergence of a particu-
lar art form – and that produces particular audiences 
which can identify, interpret and engage with that art 
form. These questions are therefore framed through 
what Michel Foucault has called an ‘author function’ 
(1992, 306): a wider discursive arrangement that sta-
bilises into what a given cultural moment perceives as 
an ‘author’ or ‘artist’.3 aesthetic issues are still under 
consideration here, but they are seen as being always 
intertwined with broader questions about cultural and 
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monetary value – and with the way such value is shaped 
and then frequently passed off as natural. in light of all 
this, i acknowledge the foundational role of art history 
and art theory for the emergence of this multidisci-
plinary cluster of practices and pedagogies that has 
recently been recognised under the (already wobbly 
and dual) umbrella term of media art/s (Grau 2007, paul 
2008). Yet, as oliver Grau argues in the introduction to 
his field-defining tome MediaArtHistories, ‘For the inter-
ests of media art it is important that we continue to take 
media art history into the mainstream of art history 
and that we cultivate a proximity to film, cultural and 
media studies, and computer science, but also to philos-
ophy and other sciences dealing with images’ (2007, 5). 
AI Art is situated at this cross-disciplinary conjuncture 
mapped out by Grau.
eschewing the more rigid organisation typical of a 
scholarly monograph, the book navigates between the 
need to introduce material, especially as far as the phil-
osophical and technical aspects of ai are concerned, 
and the ambition to say something new about the nexus 
of ai and art. To do this, it adopts a funnel-like struc-
ture that takes readers from wider contextualisation to 
specific issues concerning ai and art, to then open up 
again, from the other end, to some larger and future-
facing questions. it starts from the position that, to 
understand the promise of ai for the creative fields, we 
must not remain just in the realm of aesthetics. indeed, 
i will argue that ai art can realise this promise, or fail 
to do so, precisely when it engages with broader issues 
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around creativity, intelligence, perception and the role 
and position of the human in the world – including 
questions of labour, robotisation and the long-term sur-
vival of the human species.
Following on from this introduction, the book 
engages with wider debates about ai – from offering 
a critical overview of the very concept of intelligence 
(chapter 1), through to raising ethical questions about 
ai (chapter 2). it also attempts to locate the current 
turn to, or even hype about, ai understood as artificial 
intelligence in relation to another AI, which i call the 
‘anthropocene imperative’, and which stands for the 
need to respond to the planetary climate crisis (chap-
ter 3). starting to narrow down, the argument then 
moves on to consider the idea of creativity as applied to 
machines (chapter 4), while also tracing some histori-
cal predecessors of robot and machine art (chapter 5). 
chapters 6-8 engage more explicitly with artistic pro-
ductions that draw on ai: from generative art that uses 
neural networks through to ai’s more conceptual appli-
cations in the work of artists such as Trevor paglen and 
Lauren Mccarthy. it is here that the question of machine 
vision as not just a technical but also a political prob-
lem is addressed most directly. The book then offers a 
case study from the area of computational photogra-
phy. Looking at issues around automated creativity and 
labour, it presents a project from my own art practice 
titled View from the Window, a project which offers a per-
spective on the interlocking of machine intelligence and 
human labour (chapters 9-10). From chapter 11 onwards 
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AI Art opens up again to wider artistic and conceptual 
issues, while also speculating about yet another form of 
ai art, called here art for Another Intelligence (chapter 12). 
The book’s conclusion returns to the questions raised in 
this introduction to offer speculation on future art, and 
on art’s future, including the exploration of what a truly 
post-human art would look like – and to whom it would 
look this way.
The above summary provides a more conceptual 
account of the book’s ins and outs. But there is also an 
affective dimension to the book. AI Art is driven by my 
passion for the constantly evolving field of art, with 
all its disciplinary pluralities, kinships and transgres-
sions – and for a domain of technology through which 
we become in and with the world. coming as i do from 
the mixed background of continental philosophy, cul-
tural and media studies, and art practice, i understand 
tekhnē as a constitutive fabric of human and nonhuman 
life, which manifests itself in human activities such 
as writing and art, but also in all sorts of technologi-
cal inventions and interventions – some of which are 
enacted by the human in ensemble with machines, or 
are even led by nonhuman forms of intelligence. This 
is why i am keen to reiterate that my starting position 
in this book is by no means technophobic. indeed, i 
am deeply interested in all sorts of ‘cool things we do 
with computers’ (new scientist 2017) – incidentally, a 
phrase proposed by roger schank, emeritus professor 
of computer science at northwestern University to 
describe more accurately what goes under the name 
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of ai today. at the same time, i want to interrogate the 
philosophical assumptions and cultural blind spots 
behind the current ai discourse and the promises it 
entails, especially as this discourse relates to image 
making, art and so-called creativity more broadly.
indeed, ‘so-called’ is one of these qualifiers that 
should be inserted into most pronouncements about 
ai, starting from the very notion of intelligence (fig. 
2). it is because intelligence is actually something of a 
blind spot of the ai field, with its foundational concept 
either taken for granted without too much interrogation 
or moulded at will and then readjusted depending on 
the direction the research has taken. While some schol-
ars define intelligence as the ability to think in abstract 
terms, to learn from experience, to adapt to a complex 
environment or to ‘make the right decision in uncertain 
circumstances’ (new scientist 2017), others are wary 
of providing a strict definition of this term and rely 
instead on descriptors such as that ‘intelligence is com-
putable’ (Barrat 2013, 163).4 new ground for thinking 
about intelligence in relation to computation was paved 
in the 1950s by alan Turing, for whom the determina-
tion of whether a given system was intelligent was to 
be made purely on the basis of its behavioural capacity, 
i.e. its being able to do something (or not) (Turing 1950). 
Multiple definitions notwithstanding, the majority of 
scholars working in ai today agree on the material-
ist foundations of intelligence, ‘in at least the minimal 
sense of supposing that matter, suitably selected and 
arranged, suffices for intelligence’ (haugeland 1997, 2). 
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This understanding drives many of the present-day 
efforts to recreate its operations in a different medium 
than that of a carbon-based body. The next chapter will 
look at how we have arrived at this present moment 
– and at what we have allowed ourselves to over-
look on the way.

Fig. 2. Joanna Zylinska, photo of my interaction with Google pair’s project Wa-
terfall of Meaning at the Barbican centre exhibition ai: More than human (June 
2019). The project offers ‘a poetic glimpse into the interior of an ai, showing how 
a machine absorbs human associations between words’ (Google arts & culture 
2019). on entering the word ‘intelligence’ into the system, i saw it f loat between 
the mobile word clouds (in white) and the fixed word pairs (expensive – cheap, bad 
– good; in yellow), only to swerve decisively towards the large yellow he when 
approaching the binary pronoun pairing. The movement of the words in this in-
stallation is the outcome of ‘word embeddings’, i.e. linguistic and cultural associa-
tions humans have developed over time with regard to particular words and their 
contexts – and which the pair algorithm has learnt to follow and map out.
Chapter 1
a so-called intelligence
This chapter starts by looking at the historical antecedents of the notion of artificial intelligence and at the research it has spawned. The roots of 
ai can be traced back to aristotle’s work on formal logic: 
more specifically, the syllogism, i.e. a form of deductive 
reasoning that allows one to reach a conclusion derived 
from a number of statements with an assumed truth-
value. Yet the actual research into ai only took off in 
the 1950s, when scientists and engineers suggested that 
formal logic could be applied not just by humans but 
also by machines – and when machines were power-
ful enough to undertake these kinds of operations of 
symbolic reasoning. Much work at the time was driven 
by the desire to enable machines to think like humans, 
a criterion that later became known as the Turing Test. 
however, ‘by the 1980s ai researchers realized that 
they had neither sufficient hardware nor the knowl-
edge to simulate everything a human can do – and the 
field fragmented. instead of working towards one single 
human-equivalent computer intelligence, research 
groups splintered off to investigate specific aspects of 
the larger problem: speech recognition, computer vision 
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and probabilistic inference – even chess’ (new scientist 
2017). enthusiasm and funding slowly petered out and 
so by the early 1990s research in the field came to a halt 
in most places, marred by many disappointments and 
unrealised promises.
Yet over the last decade we have entered what some 
are calling ai 2.0. The renewed interest in ai research 
has been accompanied by a change of tack: from what 
became known as artificial General intelligence, whose 
goal was to replicate the human’s mental function-
ing as such, to specialised, or ‘narrow’ ai, focused on 
performing particular tasks and solving singular prob-
lems. The new approach involves developing artificial 
neural networks, ‘which at a rudimentary level imitate 
the way neurons in the brain work’, as well as genetic 
algorithms, ‘which imitate genetic inheritance and fit-
ness to evolve better solutions to a problem with every 
generation’ (new scientist 2017). it also entails per-
fecting what has become known as ‘deep’, or ‘machine’ 
learning, which is not the kind of learning premised on 
understanding, but which rather involves being trained 
in making quicker and more accurate decisions on the 
basis of analysing extremely large data sets. ai engines 
learn in the sense that they get better with experience at 
performing the task they have been trained to perform. 
The relative success of this new wave of ai – as evi-
denced in amazon’s recommendation algorithms, the 
autocomplete function on mobile phones, face recog-
nition, the ability of Google’s neural network launched 
in 2012 to identify cats’ faces in videos, or the victory 
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of Google’s alphaGo software over the south Korean 
master of the complex board game Go, Lee se-dol, in 
2016 – can be explained by adjusted expectations, cou-
pled with a massive increase in computational power. 
Much of what passes off for ai today is really a product 
of coupling big data with statistical analysis. impressive 
or even mysterious as some of the outcomes may look, 
they are the result of advanced calculations performed 
on large quantities of data.
new ai is therefore first and foremost a sophisti-
cated agent of pattern recognition: a post-cyberpunk 
incarnation of William Gibson’s character from his 
eponymous 2003 novel in which advertising consul-
tant cayce pollard had an almost superhuman ability 
to make connections and find meanings within the flow 
of marketing data. interestingly, current popular enter-
tainment has seen an increased presence of human 
characters who excel at pattern recognition and who, 
in a reverse scenario that reveals how popular culture 
deals with current fascinations, desires and anxieties 
with regard to technology, end up being able to emu-
late ai 2.0: we can think here of pretend harvard Law 
school graduate Matt ross from Usa network’s legal 
drama TV series Suits, nerdy hacker Mr robot from Usa 
network’s series of the same name or time travelling 
ex-soldier Takeshi Kovacs equipped with the capacity 
for total recall from netflix’s Altered Carbon. in its abil-
ity to use ‘brute force computation’, (what-looks-like) ai 
is indeed capable of achieving goals that can delight, 
surprise or even shock us humans. Fast computational 
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power coupled with the availability of large data sets 
has led to significant advances in machine learning, 
a development which has led scientists such as ray 
Kurzweil (2005) to predict the imminent era of singu-
larity in which humans will merge with machines to 
achieve one unified, and by then disembodied, intel-
ligence – coupled with immortality. nick Bostrom has 
upped the ante with his book Superintelligence (2014), 
in which he criticises Kurzweil’s concept of singular-
ity for not only being imprecise but also for sounding 
techno-utopian. Bostrom argues that the construction 
of machines whose power considerably and radically 
supersedes that of human brains will have dramatic 
consequences. rather than focus just on the arrival 
of an ai that matches human intelligence, he explores 
what he calls an intelligence explosion, a more radical 
and intense development that will ‘swoosh right by’ 
humanity. For Bostrom, ‘This is quite possibly the most 
important and most daunting challenge humanity has 
ever faced. and – whether we succeed or fail – it is prob-
ably the last challenge we will ever face’ (2014).
The resurfacing of the hubristic narratives about 
human futures spurred on by the latest ai research has 
been accompanied by the excavation of the myth of the 
robot (and its cousins, the android and the cyborg) as 
the human’s other, an intelligent companion who can 
always turn into an enemy – such as haL 9000 from 
Space Odyssey or the killer robotic dog from season 4 
of Black Mirror. popular imagination has thus once 
again been captured by both salvation narratives and 
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horror stories about ‘them’ taking over ‘us’: eliminat-
ing our jobs, conquering our habitat and killing us all in 
the end. such stories, be it in their salutary or horror-
driven guises, are premised on a rather unsophisticated 
model of the human as a self-enclosed non-techno-
logical entity, involved in eternal battle with tekhnē. 
however, humans are quintessentially technical beings, 
in the sense that we have emerged with technology and 
through our relationship to it, from flint stones used as 
tools and weapons to genetic and cultural algorithms. 
instead of pitching the human against the machine, 
shouldn’t we rather see different forms of human activ-
ity as having always relied on technical prostheses and 
forming part of technical assemblages? does this per-
spective change the story in any way? does it call for 
some better stories – and better questions?
Fig. 3. Joanna Zylinska, raw footage from Exit Man, 2017.
Chapter 2
The ethics of ai, or how to Tell 
Better stories about Technology5
To recognise humans’ kinship with technology, and thus potentially with ai, is not to say that all forms of ai are created equal (or equally benign), 
or that they may not have unforeseen consequences. it 
is rather to make a plea for probing some of the claims 
spawned by the dominant ai narrative – and by their 
intellectual and financial backers. This acknowledge-
ment repositions the seemingly eternal narrative of the 
human’s battle against technology as an ethico-political 
problem, one that needs to be investigated under given 
social conditions. The specific questions that need to 
be asked concern the modes of life that the currently 
available ai algorithms enable and disable: Whose 
brainchild (and bodychild) is the ai of today? Who and 
what does ai make life better for? Who and what can’t 
it see? What are its own blind spots? artists, media-
makers and writers can help us search for answers 
to these questions by looking askew at the current 
claims and promises about ai, with their apocalyptic 
as well as redemptive undertones – and by retelling the 
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dominant narratives in different genres and media (fig. 
3). storytelling and other forms of art making may even 
be the first step on the way to ethical, or responsible, ai.
one key reference point in contemporary dis-
cussions of ai ethics are isaac asimov’s Three Laws 
of robotics:
1 a robot may not injure a human being or, 
through inaction, allow a human being to 
come to harm.
2 a robot must obey orders given it by human 
beings except where such orders would conflict 
with the First Law.
3 a robot must protect its own existence as long 
as such protection does not conflict with the 
First or second Law. (1950, 40)
What is most interesting about asimov’s laws is not so 
much the codification of behaviour they prescribe to 
his narrative creations but rather the fact that his ‘robot 
ethics’ is part of fiction. developed in several short 
stories and published in the 1950 collection, I Robot, 
asimov’s ethical precepts are mechanical, reductive 
and naively humanist. First of all, they are premised 
on a rather restricted idea of the robot as the human’s 
truncated, and inherently obedient, other. Like many 
other forms of deontological (i.e. normative) moral 
theories, they constitute an elegantly designed ethical 
system which works as a moral parable but fails in real-
life scenarios when those precepts are put to the test. 
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it is because humans often act in an impulse-driven, 
robotic manner, when making, in a split second, what 
are meant to be ethical decisions: e.g. when rescuing 
a drowning child, intervening in a fight or deciding 
whether to shoot while flying over supposed enemy 
targets. also, humans are not only partly robotic but 
quite glitchy too. at some point they are thus bound 
– through stupidity, malice or sheer curiosity – to intro-
duce noise and error into asimov’s perfectly envisaged 
rational scenarios and creations.
Yet asimov was no moral philosopher and so to 
turn his laws into a standalone moral proposal is to 
do a disservice to the imagination and creative poten-
tial of his stories. What needs commending instead is 
asimov’s very gesture of doing ethics as/in fiction, or even 
his implicit proposition that ethical deliberation is best 
served by stories, rather than precepts or command-
ments. This is why i want to suggest that one of the most 
creative – and most needed – ways in which artists can 
use ai is by telling better stories about AI, while also imag-
ining better ways of living with AI. reflecting on the nature 
of this double ‘better’ would be the crux of such artistic 
endeavours. Mobilising the tools of imagination, visual-
isation, narrative, metaphor, parable and irony, artists 
can perhaps begin by blowing some much-needed cool 
air on the heat and hype around ai currently emitting 
from tech companies. To propose this is not to embrace a 
technophobic position or promote a return to narrative 
forms of yesteryear: detached, enclosed, single-medium 
based. it is rather to encourage artists to use their 
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technical apparatus with a view to exposing the blind 
spots behind the current ai discourse. art as a technical 
activity can thus channel the Greek origins of the term 
tekhnē, referring as it does both to technical assemblages 
such as computers, databases and neural nets and, more 
crucially perhaps, to the very process of bringing-forth, 
or creation. it can also usefully highlight the fact that, 
for ancient Greeks, there was no distinction between art 
and technology. Laurence Bertrand dorléac goes back 
even deeper in time to highlight this ontological link 
when she points out that ‘starting from the prehistoric 
caves, artists have remained connected to their techni-
cal environment, whose tools they always appropriate 
to invent new forms’ (2018, 15). interestingly, the very 
concept of artificial intelligence is premised on artifice, 
which in its Latin etymology (artificium) goes beyond the 
current meaning of deception and trickery to signal art, 
craft and skill.
When thinking about adequate responses to ethi-
cal issues raised by ai, we should also listen to some 
more sceptical voices coming from the ai community. 
andrew ng, a computer scientist at stanford University 
and former chief scientist at china’s internet giant 
Baidu, said in 2015: ‘i don’t work on preventing ai from 
turning evil for the same reason that i don’t work on 
combating overpopulation on the planet Mars’ (new 
scientist 2017). in Life 3.0: Being Human in the Age of 
Artificial Intelligence cosmologist Max Tegmark points out 
that the reason for this restraint is primarily temporal, 
as it will be quite a while until we are able to build an 
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artificial General intelligence (aGi) which poses a sig-
nificant threat to the existence of the human species. 
(some ai engineers do worry about this threat, as we 
will see in the next chapter.) Yet to worry about it now, 
claims Tegmark, would serve as a detraction from the 
current research into the field. Tegmark also points out 
that the dismissal of such fears as unwarranted is one 
of the very few things the majority of ai researchers 
actually agree on, although they cannot even pinpoint 
what this ‘quite a while’ would stand for, with utopians 
believing aGi will arrive within the next twenty to a 
hundred years and techno-sceptics pointing to centu-
ries. Tegmark believes that, when aGi does eventually 
arrive, engineers will already have found a solution: a 
so-called ‘beneficial ai’ whose goals will supposedly be 
aligned with those of humans. The fact that, over cen-
turies, humans have not managed to align their goals 
with one another when it comes to such fundamental 
issues as the value of human (and nonhuman) life, and 
that they have in fact created and embedded political 
systems that are fundamentally premised on value dif-
ferentials when it comes to life, seems to escape many of 
the well-meaning ai thinkers.
By borrowing from andrew ng’s scepticism with 
regard to the supposed existential threat posed by ai, i 
am not by any means advocating that we abandon criti-
cality: only that we assess more realistically the current 
stage of technological research and the claims made in 
its name. This will also need to involve accepting that 
traditional moral paradigms, with their religiously 
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inflected, transcendent notions of good and evil, cannot 
be unproblematically applied to ai issues. The prob-
lem here is with our age-old humanism, which draws 
on culturally constructed values it then passes off as 
universal, while also veiling the very act of their con-
struction, with all the power mechanisms involved in 
the process. When it comes to ai, such an application 
of traditional moral theory, with its discrete rational 
subject, is also most likely going to be futile – as well as 
intellectually inadequate – given that it frames the ai 
agent as a mere extension of the human, without allow-
ing for the possibility that ai’s intelligence may take the 
form that is not only superior to that of the human, but 
also unrecognisable by humans as intelligence. (We have 
already failed the intelligence recognition test with 
regard to octopi, as the illuminating book, Other Minds: 
The Octopus and the Evolution of Intelligent Life by peter 
Godfrey-smith, indicates.) Traditional moral theory 
with its disembodied rational moral subject is actually 
inadequate in many, perhaps most, other cases where 
no ai is involved.6 This is why i want to suggest that, 
alongside artistic modes of engagement, many of the 
problems currently discussed under the umbrella of 
‘ai ethics’ would be much better served by policy dis-
cussions, with that old-school mode of intervention, 
regulation, offering a more pragmatic way of counter-
ing some of the failures of the ethics discourse. This is 
especially important in light of the fact that ethics is 
often just mobilised as a rhetorical and legal smoke-
screen aimed at getting the industry ‘off the hook’, with 
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companies hiring moral philosophers and virtue-sig-
nalling their attachment to ‘ethical values’ while trying 
to overcome national-level legislation and societal 
expectations. any meaningful discussion of ai ethics 
therefore needs to take place in a wider socio-political 
context, rather than a purely procedural one.
contrary to the majority of ai researchers discussed 
by Tegmark who claim we should not ‘worry’ about ai 
now because, when the time to worry comes, we will 
have already come up with a technofix, i believe that 
interesting and imaginative discussions about ai could 
not be more timely. This is why my argument in this 
book joins the already unfolding conversation about the 
aesthetics, ethics and politics of ai to address the rela-
tionship between ai and art, or more broadly, ai and 
creative activity in different media, right here right now. 
even if the current technology only allows us to call 
present-day creations ‘prefigurative ai art’ – because, 
according to Tegmark, no one seriously believes that 
‘proper ai’ is going to happen any time soon (which is 
why many scientists and engineers tend to avoid the 
all-catch term ‘ai’ and prefer to use more precise terms 
such as ‘machine learning’, ‘natural language process-
ing’ or ‘computer vision’) – something is already happening. 
This ‘something’, which is a confluence of technical and 
cultural changes, industry claims, popular anxieties, 
moral panics and creative interventions across different 
media and platforms, demands our attention, i suggest. 
i thus take ng’s declaration that he doesn’t work on pre-
venting ai from turning evil for the same reason that 
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he doesn’t work on combating overpopulation on Mars 
as a call for rhetorical and conceptual restraint, but also 
for imagining better narratives about ai, beyond horror 
stories and fairy tales.

Fig. 4. screenshot of the reimagine ai’s / human impact Lab’s The Climate Clock, 
showing the status quo on June 27, 2019, at 11:28 GMT, https://climateclock.net/.
Chapter 3
Why now? ai as the 
anthropocene imperative
intriguingly, Mars is precisely where many silicon Valley entrepreneurs plan to relocate in order to avoid the imminent threat of overpopulation, the 
shortage of resources and the ecological disasters 
brought on by climate change. i would go so far as to 
suggest that the renewed interest in ai on the part of 
silicon Valley researchers and investors is a response, 
although not necessarily a direct or even acknowledged 
one, to a number of planetary-scale issues associated 
with the anthropocene.7 The anthropocene as a new 
geological epoch during which human impact upon our 
planet has been described as being both stratigraphi-
cally significant and irreversible has become one of 
the dominant crisis narratives our times. it has led not 
only to an increased awareness of environmental issues 
across the globe but also to a concerted effort to develop 
effective forms of ecological consciousness and ecologi-
cal praxis which are meant to help repair the planetary 
damage. The anthropocene narrative reveals how the 
belief in seemingly interminable growth has led to 
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depletion, scarcity and the crisis of biological and social 
life. This revelation prompts a reflection on what we 
can do about the crisis we have at least partly authored. 
in this context, i would like to propose we see ai as 
standing not just for artificial intelligence but also 
for the anthropocene imperative: a call to us humans 
to respond to those multiple crises of life while there 
is still time.
My view is that silicon Valley fails spectacularly in 
responding to this imperative: the discourse of extinc-
tion brought on by the awareness of the anthropocene 
merely results in a desire on the part of many ai 
researchers and investors to reverse-engineer extinc-
tion via ai, to Make Man Great again (Zylinska 2018). 
extinction is understood by them not to be the result of 
anthropogenic climate change, or even of an irrevers-
ible course of natural history, but rather as a technical 
problem to be solved. even if, as argued earlier, we have 
nothing to ‘worry’ about right now, this lack of worry 
does not mean that intelligent machines will not 
eventually pose a threat to the human species. The 
robotically-framed discourse of extinction has made 
its way into current ai thinking, with apocalypticism 
competing against the rosier visions of human-machine 
unity, and against ideas about imminent technofixes. 
in a biographical note on himself penned in the third 
person in 1998, mathematician i. J. Good, who ‘had 
served as chief statistician in alan Turing’s code-break-
ing team in World War ii’ (Bostrom 2014) and whose 
work had been foundational to much of ai research, 
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abandoned his earlier technooptimism to convey his 
horror about the ai explosion. The note proclaimed:
[The paper] ‘speculation concerning the First 
Ultraintelligent Machine’ (1965) … began: ‘The 
survival of man depends on the early construc-
tion of an ultraintelligent machine’. Those were 
his [Good’s] words during the cold War, and he 
now suspects that ‘survival’ should be replaced 
by ‘extinction’. he thinks that, because of inter-
national competition, we cannot prevent the 
machines from taking over. he thinks we are 
lemmings. (cited in Barrat 2013, 117)
significantly, the present-day capital-fuelled human 
thinking on ai itself manifests a rather narrow set of 
intelligence markers, which are premised on a trun-
cated, disembodied and yet so-very-gendered model of 
human subjectivity. There is therefore something rather 
dry about current ai research and the promises that 
drive it – not in the sense that it is too dense, complex 
or even perhaps too intelligent to be written about in an 
exciting way. That is certainly not the case. ai research 
is dry, i suggest, because it is premised on hydropho-
bia, i.e. wariness of the material or, better, elemental 
side of media technology.8 even though doomsday sce-
narios offered by certain ai gurus – like the claim by 
sci-fi author and mathematics professor Vernor Vinge 
that ‘The threat landscape going forward is very bad. 
We’re not spending enough effort thinking about fail-
ure possibilities’ (cited in Barrat 2013, 123) – sound like 
they would be referring precisely to the climate crisis, 
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their focus, as is the case with Vinge, is much narrower: 
they are merely pointing to designing ourselves into 
extinction by AI. a strangely unified ‘we’ is evoked in 
such narratives, positing the whole of humanity as both 
culprit and victim of ai, with computational research 
understood as a kind of multiuser arms-race game.
pulling themselves up by the bootstraps of their own 
capital, shooting cars into space while planning to relo-
cate to a secure bunker in new Zealand once a disaster 
strikes (see o’connell 2018), many silicon Valley 
visionaries seemingly remain blind to the encroaching 
reality of a different form of deluge than the currently 
experienced data flood: a literal overflow that awaits 
most coastal regions in the world. as reported by The 
Guardian in 2016,
Technology giants including Facebook and 
Google face the prospect of their prestigious 
silicon Valley headquarters becoming swamped 
by water as rising sea levels threaten to sub-
merge much of the property development boom 
gripping san Francisco and the Bay area. sea 
level forecasts by a coalition of scientists show 
that the silicon Valley bases for Facebook, 
Google and cisco are at risk of being cut off or 
even flooded, even under optimistic scenarios 
where rapid cuts in greenhouse gas emissions 
avoid the most severe sea level increases. 
(Milman 2016)
it may seem disingenuous to position the renewed 
rise of interest in ai, aka artificial intelligence, as 
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a replacement problem for the other ai that i have 
been foregrounding here under the rubric of the 
anthropocene narrative. But i am not trying to sug-
gest that the ai research community manifests any 
explicit climate change denial. The claim i am making 
is that the direction, tenor and focus of the current ai 
research make this research look like a displacement activity 
with regard to the planetary issues concerning our cli-
mate and, ultimately, our survival, with climate change 
presented as being ultimately fixable by technol-
ogy. The still very gendered engineering mindset that 
shapes the ai field is wedded to what i referred to in my 
earlier work as masculinist solutionism (see Zylinska 
2014, 2018). The imagined solutions involve nuclear fis-
sion, designed to provide alternative energy sources to 
fossil fuels, or geoengineering, in the form of inject-
ing carbon into the soil or deflecting solar radiation by 
installing mirrors in space. such solutions are currently 
being discussed in some quarters as viable fixes to the 
climate problem, while also reassuring investor-specu-
lators about the continued support for growth economy. 
combatting climate change as such is therefore seen as 
less urgent by the majority of investors than combat-
ting robots. at the foundational meeting in 2014 of the 
Future of Life institute, which Tegmark co-leads with, 
among others, skype founder Jaan Tallinn, and whose 
scientific advisory Board includes nick Bostrom and 
elon Musk, ‘There was broad consensus that although 
we should pay attention to biotech, nuclear weapons and 
climate change, our first major goal should be to help 
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make ai-safety research mainstream’ (Tegmark 2017). 
Tegmark justifies this conclusion by arguing that ‘in 
comparison with climate change, which might wreak 
havoc in fifty to two hundred years, many experts 
expect ai to have greater impact within decades – and 
to potentially give us technology for mitigating climate 
change’ (2017). Given that there is much actual evidence 
of climate change affecting life on our planet here and 
now and not in some kind of remote future, and that 
any exploration of the threats posed to humanity by 
ai is mainly speculation at this point – partly because 
we do not yet have aGi – it is hard to avoid a conclusion 
that ai researchers just prefer to turn their eyes away 
from the anthropocene imperative. put crudely, it looks 
like it is simply more fun to continue playing their com-
puter game(s).
Token gestures such as lending help to ai-driven 
artistic projects about climate change do not alter the 
wider trend and direction of the current ai research. 
indeed, works by outfits such as the Montreal-based 
creative studio reimagine ai, who list Google, autodesk 
and the ‘Good anthropocene’ promoters Future earth 
as their ‘partners and collaborators’, actually end up 
reinforcing the misguided message that time is on our side. 
reimagine ai’s The Climate Clock (fig. 4), projected as a 
sequence of digits enclosed in an orbit, visualises global 
warming by showing the time left until the world’s 
temperatures rise in a way that will have a significant 
impact upon life on our planet (14 years for a 1.5ºc rise, 
27 – for a 2.0ºc rise at the time of writing). Their Rising 
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Seas, in turn, is an interactive 3d platform that ‘allows 
users to visualize and understand the real impacts of 
sea level rise at specific iconic public locations’.9 such 
visualisations can ultimately have a mollifying effect 
because they replace the horror vacui, i.e. the possibility 
of the disappearance of life as we know it – which the 
human sensorium is seemingly unable to grasp fully, 
notwithstanding popular culture’s fascination with 
apocalyptic tropes – with a series of palatable images, 
digits and graphs.
But things do not have to be this way. artists could 
take the anthropocene imperative more seriously 
than the Valley-based investors and researchers do 
by expanding the range of survival scenarios beyond 
the technofixes that include the de-extinction of the 
vanished species, space colonisation and an intelli-
gence race against robots. ai-driven art that responds 
responsibly to the anthropocene imperative could thus 
help us expand the current imaginary, allowing for the 
emergence of new visions and vistas for the world to 
come. Shapeshifting AI and Shadow Glass, two projects by 
the intersectional feminist collective voidLab included 
as part of the ‘Feminist climate change: Beyond the 
Binary’ exhibition put together by the school of the 
arts and the department of design Media arts at UcLa 
at the 2017 ars electronica: Festival for art, Technology 
and society may show us the way, at least conceptu-
ally. in their installations which remix human voice, 
ambient sound and 3d animation, the artists have 
created an eerie environment for taking on political 
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questions concerning algorithms, with their current 
forms of oppression and othering. Both reimagine ai 
and voidLab engage with ai primarily on a rhetorical 
level: theirs are not ai art projects as such, but rather 
computer-based works that mobilise ai as their theme 
and concept, with a view to contributing to the debate 
about human and nonhuman futures, on our planet 
and beyond. While reimagine ai ultimately domesti-
cate the ai threat, voidLab explore its weird edges in 
an attempt to politicise it. ‘alienation has been a source 
of power for those who have already been alienated in 
society’, the machinic voiceover in the Shapeshifting AI 
video, which cuts up an interview with writer nora 
Khan, proclaims. By introducing a rift within the 
seamless concept of ‘humanity’ that underpins much of 
current ai thinking, with its sense of a unified species 
sporting unified goals, it shifts the parameters of the ai 
debate beyond the naïve ‘us’ and ‘them’ dyad. voidLab’s 
projects do not count as ai art but rather as art about AI, 
but they manage to raise poignant questions about the 
narrow concept of ‘us’ in ai research. With that, they 
pave the ground for a more critical engagement with the 
very terms of the ai debate.

Figs. 5a-5b. screenshots from The Next Rembrandt video,  
inG / Microsoft 2016.
Chapter 4
‘can computers Be creative?’:  
a Misguided Question
While mainstream ai researchers bury their heads in virtual sand that will be of no use once the sea levels rise, much of what passes 
for ai-driven art, especially of the industry-sponsored 
variety, remains quite superficial, even if visually 
captivating. The projects that gain most public atten-
tion are those that embrace ai rather instrumentally, 
with aesthetics reduced to things looking ‘beautiful’, 
i.e. symmetrical, mesmerising, garish, and, first of all, 
similar to what already exists. even some of the more 
thoughtful engagements with the creative side of ai 
principally understand art – be it music, painting, or 
literature – in terms of structure and pattern, with sub-
sequent diversions from the established code and canon 
being treated as creative interventions. The more criti-
cal understanding of art in terms of the creation of new 
forms of expression with a view to saying something 
different about the world, or actually intervening in it, 
is ignored for the sake of what we might term ‘crowd-
sourced beauty’, a rebooted version of ‘i know what i 
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like’. creativity, another term regularly used to brand 
such works and declare their success, is reduced here to 
the repetition of the same. This mechanism is revealed 
most explicitly in the public and, inevitably, curatorial 
fascination with what we may call ‘ai imitation work’, 
also known as ‘style transfer’. This mode of artistic pro-
duction departs from the classical conceptualisation of 
art in terms of mimesis, i.e. the imitation of nature and 
its representation. For aristotle, all art was mimetic, but 
mimesis, proceeding by addition and not just repeti-
tion, involved what we would today call a ‘remediation’ 
(Bolter and Grusin 2002) of nature. it was thus a form 
of creative engagement, although one that was not 
yet linked to the humanist notions of originality and 
genius. Unlike mimesis, ‘style transfer’ is pure mimicry: 
a belaboured resemblance which is also a masquerade. 
in the context of the ai industry, where much of this 
kind of mimicry art is being produced, we need to ask: 
what underpins those efforts and what is it they actu-
ally attempt to masquerade as?
in 2016 a projected dubbed The Next Rembrandt, led by 
Microsoft in collaboration with private and public insti-
tutions, garnered significant attention worldwide (figs. 
5a-5b). a painting seemingly looking like it had come 
from under the brush of the dutch master was unveiled 
in amsterdam. Featuring a white gentleman with facial 
hair, wearing dark clothes with a white collar and a hat, 
and positioned against a dark background, it was based 
on the results of a deep learning algorithm analysing 
over 300 scans of the existing works by rembrandt and 
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coming up with their most characteristic features. The 
data obtained was then transformed into a new image 
and 3d-printed with ink that simulated oil paint, to 
offer realistic-looking texture and depth. hitting all 
the keys in the rhetorical register of ai art, Microsoft 
proudly declared: ‘it is a visualization of data in a beau-
tifully creative form. it is a powerful demonstration how 
data can be, “… used to make life itself more beautiful”’.10 
The ‘can it pass?’ question posed in relation to ai-based 
art which is modelled on the existing historical canons, 
genres and individual artists’ styles receives a lot of 
public and media attention for a number of reasons. 
First, it shows up patron- and market-driven conven-
tions based on the supposed aura of the master and 
(usually) his uniqueness as manufactured. artist Joseph 
rabie has suggested in a posting to the nettime mail-
ing list that ‘a rembrandt-painting computer is no more 
than an algorithm, devised by talented programmers 
who have enabled it to “teach itself” the rules allowing 
it to mimic the painter. This is not art, but the empir-
ical science of perception being modelled and applied 
at a high level’.11 Yet this supposedly scientific notion of 
perception, tied as it is to the expert idea of art, is pre-
cisely what tends to rile the general public. imitation art 
thus encourages populist sneering at experts, who may 
end up being ‘taken in’ by an artificially generated van 
Gogh or Bacon. Last but not least, this kind of guessing 
game with regard to the provenance of an ai-generated 
piece is seen by many as good fun, a point to which i 
will return later on.
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These imitation experiments in ai thus open up an 
interesting debate about our conventionally accepted 
parameters of authorship, originality, expertise and 
taste. New Scientist has raised an important philosophi-
cal point with regard to simulation works such as The 
Next Rembrandt and its kin: ‘if it is so easy to break down 
the style of some of the world’s most original composers 
into computer code, that means some of the best human 
artists are more machine-like than we would like to 
think’ (2017). a similar line of thinking has been offered 
by philosopher of technology Vilém Flusser, who argues 
that humans in the industrial society exist in a close-
knit relationship with their apparatuses, which are 
more than old-style tools such as hammers, scythes or 
paintbrushes that operate on matter. instead, contem-
porary apparatuses consist of machines, the software 
they run on as well as their wider infrastructures, with 
their multi-level operations enacting symbolic as much 
as material transformations.
The human’s relationship with technology is not 
one of enslavement, even if Flusser does raise serious 
questions for the humanist notion of agency. Yet he also 
recognises that machinic entanglement facilitates new 
kinds of action, which he deems collaborations. he goes 
so far as to suggest that ‘This is a new kind of function 
in which human beings are neither the constant nor 
the variable but in which human beings and apparatus 
merge into a unity’ (Flusser 2000, 27). Flusser is writing 
about photographers, evoking the camera as a quint-
essential modern apparatus that takes human labour 
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beyond the sphere of pure toil and into what we might 
call playful co-creation, yet his argument arguably 
extends to other forms of human creativity. humans’ 
creative activity is understood by Flusser as an execu-
tion of the machine’s programme and involves making 
a selection from the range of options determined by the 
machine’s algorithm. We could suggest that this algo-
rithmic relationship which humans depend on is not 
only actualised in the post-industrial society, even if it 
does take a particular form and turn at that time, but 
rather that it has been foundational to the constitu-
tion of the human as a technical being – who actuated 
this humanness in relation with technical objects such 
as fire, sticks and stones (see simondon 2016, stiegler 
1998). humans’ everyday functioning also depends on 
the execution of a programme: a sequence of possibili-
ties enabled by various couplings of adenine, cytosine, 
guanine, and thymine, i.e. dna. as i argued elsewhere,12 
this proposition should not be taken as a postulation of 
a mindless technological or biological determinism that 
would remove from humans any possibility of action 
as artists, critics or spectators – and any responsibil-
ity for the actions we take. Yet accepting our affinity 
with other living beings across the evolutionary spec-
trum and recognising that our human lives are subject 
to biochemical reactions that we are not fully in con-
trol of, does undermine the humanist parameters of the 
debate about creativity, art and ai. Flusser’s concept of 
a ‘programmed freedom’ is premised on the recognition 
that, while ‘the apparatus functions as a function of the 
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photographer’s intention, this intention itself functions 
as a function of the camera’s program’ (2002, 35).
disallowing a strict division between humans and 
robots, our (supposed) genius and artificial intelligence, 
such a post-human view of the human recalibrates 
human creativity as partly computational. once again, 
to say this is not to resign ourselves to passivity by con-
cluding that humans are incapable of creating anything, 
that we are nothing but clockwork devices responding 
to impulses. it is only to concede, after Flusser, that, 
just as the imagination of the apparatus is greater than 
that of all artists across history,13 the imagination of 
‘the programme called life’ in which we all participate, 
and which is an outcome of multiple processes run-
ning across various scales of the universe, far exceeds 
our human imagination. To understand how humans 
can operate within the constraints of the apparatus 
that is part of us becomes a new urgent task for a (much 
needed) post-humanist art history and art theory. in 
this new paradigm for understanding art, the human 
would be conceived as part of the machine, dispositive 
or technical system – and not its inventor, owner and 
ruler. a post-humanist art history would see instead 
all art works, from cave paintings through to the works 
of so-called Great Masters and contemporary experi-
ments with all kinds of technologies, as having been 
produced by human artists in an assembly with a plethora 
of nonhuman agents: drives, impulses, viruses, drugs, var-
ious organic and nonorganic substances and devices, as 
well as all sorts of networks – from mycelium through 
‘can computers Be creative?’: a Misguided Question 55
to the internet. The frequently posed question, ‘can 
computers be creative?’, which i promised to address 
in this book, therefore reveals itself to be rather reduc-
tive because it is premised on a pre-technological idea 
of the human as a self-contained subject of decision and 
action. The ‘computer’, be it in the shape of a data-pro-
cessing machine, a robot or an algorithm, is only seen 
here as an imperfect approximation of such a human. 
But, in light of the argument laid out here, we should 
rather be asking, after Flusser, whether the human can 
actually be creative, or, more precisely: in what way can 
the human be creative?
Fig. 6. Leonel Moura, 050517, 2017, permanent ink on pVc canvas, 280 x 470 cm. 
Fondation Guy and Myriam Ullens collection. courtesy of the artist.
Chapter 5
artists, robots and ‘Fun’
as proclaimed in the opening section, ‘a Machine for creating’, in the catalogue for the exhibition Artistes & Robots at the Grand palais in paris 
in 2018, which focused on exploring multiple ways in 
which artists were using ai, ‘The robots don’t replace 
the artist or art: they invite us to ask what makes a 
work of art – and what makes an artist’ (dorléac and 
neutres 2018, 59). That opening section provided an 
important historical overview of robotic art, or rather, 
of art co-produced with robots, since 1950. Many of the 
works included in the show were examples of painting 
or drawing robots: they were early predecessors of the 
‘painting like rembrandt’ trend, while being visually 
and technically complex artefacts in their own right. 
The exhibition opened with the striking cybernetic 
spatio-dynamic sculpture CYSP 1 (1956), looking like a 
3d Mondrian mobile, by the precursor of robotic art 
nicolas schöffer. schöffer’s pronouncement: ‘The artist 
no longer creates work; he creates creation’ (neutres 
2018, 189) could be taken as a motto for the show. The 
exhibition also featured a metallic reptile-like paint-
ing robot called Méta-Matic no 6 by Jean Tinguely from 
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1959, and so Kanno and Takahiro Yamaguchi’s Senseless 
Drawing Bot, a self-propelling machine placed on a 
skateboard and spraying graffiti-like squiggles on the 
wall. Then there was Human Study #2.d, La Vanité by 
patrick Tresset: a stripped-down robotic arm holding a 
Bic pen, endlessly drawing a vanitas sketch on an old 
school desk while responding to human movement and 
gaze. Tackling the recurrent question about the nature 
of human and nonhuman creativity, the show’s co-cura-
tor Jérôme neutres has explained that artists working 
with robots, be it in their overtly machinic or more 
algorithmic form (or both), are creating machines that 
subsequently create works which those artists could 
not accomplish by themselves. naturally, artists do not 
construct these machines just to get ‘help’ but rather to 
probe the limits of the human idea of creativity and of 
human-machinic assemblages. These works are thus 
described as collaborations between the artists and the 
robotic systems those artists have designed.
one of the most playful pieces in the exhibition 
was the aptly titled Robot Art by Leonel Moura, a 2017 
iteration of his ensemble of small robotic vehicles tra-
versing a large sheet of paper and leaving multicoloured 
line marks on it, to create a large abstraction. Moura 
explains that his robots have been equipped with envi-
ronmental awareness and a small ‘brain’ that runs 
algorithms based on simple rules. The images obtained 
are not designed in advance but are rather the result of 
randomness and communication between the robots 
on the canvas (fig. 6). The artist’s focus is on exploring 
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complexity in art, especially as produced in collabo-
ration with robots. it is worth quoting at length the 
exposition of Moura’s ideas, presented in an interview 
with Arts journal in July 2018, as he articulated there 
very cogently many of the issues i am dealing with in 
this book, while also taking some steps towards outlin-
ing what i am calling a post-humanist art theory:
it has been understood since at least the birth of 
abstraction that the main issue in art is neither 
its production nor the individual artistic sensi-
bility by which it is guided. The main issue of art 
is art itself: its history, evolution, and innova-
tive contributions. anything can be considered 
art if validated by one of the several art world 
mechanisms including museums, galleries, 
specialised media, critics, curators, and/or col-
lectors. only in this way has the duchampian 
ready-made and most of the art produced 
since been accepted and integrated into the 
formal art realm.
Whether a work of art is made directly by 
a human artist or is the product of any other 
type of process is nowadays of no relevance. 
recent art history shows many examples of 
art works based on random procedures, fortu-
itous explorations, objets trouvés, and arbitrary 
constructions. surrealism, for example, even 
tried to take human consciousness out of the 
loop. More decisive is whether or not a new art 
form expands the field of art. since the advent 
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of modernism, innovation has become a more 
important criterion in evaluating artistic proj-
ects than personal ability. …
[s]ince robots like those i use are able to gen-
erate novelty, it must also be recognized that 
they have at least some degree of creativity. … 
The algorithm and the basic rules introduced 
thereby via the robot microchip are not so very 
different, furthermore, from education. no one 
will claim that a given novel is the product of 
the author’s school teacher. To the extent that 
the author, human or machine, incorporates 
new information, the art work becomes not 
only unique but also the result of the author’s 
own creativity. in short, i teach the robots 
how to paint, but afterward, it is not my doing. 
(Moura 2018)
Moura’s reflections implicitly engage with the dialogue 
on the nature of human and machine creativity initiated 
by harold cohen in 1973, when he launched his painting 
programme called aaron. having raised the question 
of authorial singularity and distributed production of 
art in the computer science and media art communities, 
aaron has undergone multiple iterations since then, 
but it still demonstrates a rather narrow scope of cre-
ative possibilities when it comes to what and how it can 
paint. Moura seems to have taken things much further, 
visually and conceptually. indeed, there is something 
playfully mischievous about his pronouncements 
cited above, especially as far as his supposed partial 
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resignation from the role of the artist and his ceding of 
the creative ground to the machine and the algorithm 
are concerned. But it is only a very particular, and argu-
ably old-fashioned and masculinist, idea of the artist 
as a creative genius at odds with the world, one who is 
also standing above the world, that is being challenged 
here. The robotic artist unveiled by Moura and his pre-
decessors is of the world, he (or she, as the case may be 
in many current experiments with ai art) is also in the 
world. There is therefore a subtle socio-political message 
implied in this repositioning too. apart from concep-
tual mischief, playfulness is actually what underpins 
many of the robotic art projects, both in their earlier 
and more recent guises. Many robots and other arte-
facts in the paris exhibition were described as cute 
by the visitors. Their clunky movement, wobbly gait 
and unwieldy architecture often evoked a smile from 
members of the audience, who seemed mesmerised by 
the machines’ picture-making efforts. it was not the 
images themselves that attracted attention but rather 
the whole performance of a machinic device attempting 
to draw or paint something, live. art historian Laurence 
Bertrand dorléac sees these ‘joyful’ painting machines 
as belonging in the tradition of performance art, surre-
alism, dada and ludic experience (dorléac 2018, 21-22). 
it is precisely the live, experiential aspect of robotic art 
rather than its machinic component that is highlighted 
as most significant for her.
indeed, it could be argued that the ‘joyfulness’ of 
robotic and ai art is where its force lies, opening up the 
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possibility of not only reaching to audiences outside the 
traditional exhibition spaces but also of redefining the 
very idea of what it means to make, display and distrib-
ute art. in this respect, the Artistes & Robots exhibition 
was still rather conventional: held in a white-walled 
cavernous exhibition space built in the Beaux-arts 
style at the dawn of the twentieth century, it raised 
interesting questions about the potential of machinic 
creativity, while simultaneously inscribing robotic and 
ai art within the bounds of artistic grandeur and his-
torical continuity. This was also a way of controlling its 
‘joyful’ aspect by the high-brow mechanisms of archi-
tecture, culture and taste. in the meantime, the visually 
kitsch and derivative ai-inspired works of the ‘style 
transfer’ kind, which proliferate on the internet, have 
embraced full-on the fun aspect of artistic production. 
Fabrice Bousteau, curator of another paris exhibition 
devoted to digital and electronic art – La Belle Vie numéri-
que held at Fondation Groupe edF in 2017-2018 – has 
argued that digital and ai art opens up to, or even cre-
ates, different publics beyond traditional gallery goers 
precisely because it declares a wider realm of people as 
‘artists’, from programmers and engineers through to 
instagrammers (Lavrador 2017b, 9-11). it could there-
fore perhaps be suggested that ai has the potential to 
reboot what has been known, in a somewhat folksy way, 
as ‘outsider art’. ‘style transfer’ art is very much alive on 
the internet, transforming the format of the museum 
and the gallery into a fluid display of experiment, joy 
and fun. But the conventional cultural institutions are 
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also undergoing change with the arrival of new artistic 
and design practices. neutres points out that ‘not only 
have the robots entered the museum, but they have 
actually even built it: the dome of the Louvre abu dhabi 
was designed by an algorithm’ (2018, 11).
Fig. 7. stephen r. Melling, Mona Lisa, The Louvre, 2014. Flickr, cc BY-nd 2.0.
Chapter 6
The Work of art in the age of 
Machinic creation
ai-driven art can be understood as another turn in the entangled history of humans and tech-nology. challenging the notion of art as an 
expression of godlike creativity premised on the cre-
ation of absolute novelty ex nihilo (see still and d’inverno 
2016), i want to suggest that art is always already emer-
gent in- and with the world – and with the multiple 
technical apparatuses that shape the world. i am there-
fore inclined to take heed from psychologist arthur 
still and computer scientist Mark d’inverno, who argue 
that ai research should remodel its concept of creativ-
ity along the lines of thought developed by philosopher 
of science a. n. Whitehead and premised on ‘biological 
and social models of creativity’. For Whitehead, creativ-
ity is change that occurs in a way in which organisms 
act on their environments. still and d’inverno go on 
to claim that ai research would also benefit from 
adopting a concept of intelligence ‘based on attentive 
inquiry’ and arising out of the relations of the human 
with the environment. They end up with a proposal for 
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an ‘approach to designing systems supporting being 
in the world’ (still and d’inverno 2016), which seems 
aligned with Moura’s artistic ideas. Their framework 
is nonetheless still quite humanist, in that it gives pre-
cedence, although perhaps understandably, to human 
goals and human values as the driving force of future 
system design.14 But it also creates an opening towards 
a more entangled and less antagonistic model of envis-
aging future ai systems, and hence towards a better ai 
discourse. The main premise of this discourse, i sug-
gest, would not pitch the human against the machine 
but would rather adopt the human-with-the-machine, 
or even, more radically, the human-as-a-machine sce-
nario, which we briefly explored earlier on.
Marcus du satoy, a mathematician and author of 
The Creativity Code: How AI Is Learning to Write, Paint 
and Think, embraces multiple definitions of creativity 
engaged by ai researchers, including the pioneering 
work of Margaret Boden (2004), to suggest that being 
creative means diverging from the established path we 
carve out and then follow each day. he is particularly 
interested in Boden’s idea of transformational creativ-
ity, which refers to those rare moments that become 
complete game changers. Those moments normally 
involve stepping outside the system, be it technologi-
cal or cultural. ‘That is where a machine might help’, 
du satoy suggests in a narrative twist that traces cre-
ativity from the machine to the human. ‘[p]erhaps it 
could give us that jolt, throw up a new suggestion, 
stop us from simply repeating the same algorithm 
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each day. The machines might ultimately help us, as 
humans, to behave less like machines’ (du satoy 2019). 
creativity in ai means for him a computer being able 
to ‘come up with something new, surprising and of 
value’ (2019), exceeding the pre-designed ideas of its 
coder. computers could thus perhaps make us humans 
less computational. interestingly, du satoy points out 
that creativity ‘meaning something novel with value 
is actually a very twentieth-century capitalist take on 
the word’ (2019). This understanding of the term has its 
origin in the self-help books written in the 1940s by the 
advertising executive alex osborn, who attempted to 
implement innovation in businesses and their employ-
ees. The earlier meaning of creativity, offers du satoy, 
referred to ‘humans’ attempts to understand being 
in the world’ (2019). To suggest that creative activity, 
including art, has always been artificially intelligent, 
and that so have we, is thus not to engage in a form of 
intellectual acrobatics in which categories becomes 
fuzzy and everything starts looking like everything 
else. it is rather to trace the historical and philosophi-
cal legacy of the concept of creativity in the dominant 
narrative on ai today, with a view to recognising the 
false starts, failed promises and warped dreams that lie 
behind various narratives of technological innovation 
and progress.
in a poignant article titled ‘YouTubers: The Last 
artists’, polish writer Jacek dukaj revisits Walter 
Benjamin’s classic essay ‘The Work of art in the age 
of Mechanical reproduction’ (1969) to consider what 
chapter 6 68
happens to the long-gone aura in art in the times of ai. 
For Benjamin the possibility of mechanically reproduc-
ing art works altered the original compact upon which 
art was premised by changing the artefacts from price-
less objects of admiration to products that were part 
of the wider circulation of goods on the market. While 
acknowledging the loss of both the idea and the sensa-
tion of uniqueness in art prompted by this possibility 
of art’s low-cost reproduction, the German philosopher 
identified a democratising potential in the latter pro-
cess. The loss of the aura thus also went hand in hand 
with the rise in political awareness amongst those who 
had traditionally been excluded from the highbrow 
aesthetic experience, as their senses were now being 
drawn in to participate in the newly demystified circuit 
of artistic exchange. Benjamin’s piece, first published 
in 1935, referred to the more traditional technologies of 
print, photography and film, while also offering a pre-
science of the wider cultural transformation that was 
going to occur in the digital age. indeed, today almost all 
art and all cultural production can be digitised, allow-
ing people to hold a Winged Victory of samothrace, a 
Van Gogh or a Book of Kells in their hand, albeit flat-
tened on a small glass rectangle. dukaj also highlights 
the fact that ai is already involved in the production of 
the majority of cultural artefacts nowadays. For exam-
ple, hollywood blockbusters are edited on high-power 
computers using software with ai features that allow 
radical creative control after the shoot, but they are also 
planned, programmed and marketed on the basis of 
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Big data obtained from user profiling across different 
platforms to check the product’s desirability and min-
imise investors’ risk. ai is here more than just a tool: 
it becomes an active agent in shaping tastes, regulating 
markets and defining what counts as mainstream visu-
ality. The work of art is therefore not just mechanically 
reproduced but also algorithmically produced.
The current renewed interest in ‘experiences’ such 
as live concerts and immersive cinema does not con-
tradict or even change the learned behaviours of the 
digital generation to have this supposed authenticity 
mediated – via Facebook, Twitter or instagram. indeed, 
the majority of people looking at the Mona Lisa in the 
Louvre today are actually photographing the expe-
rience of being in the crowd of people looking at the 
Mona Lisa (fig. 7). This is not to say that their encoun-
ter with the Mona Lisa is less ‘authentic’, although it 
is certainly less auratic in the Benjaminian sense. it 
is rather to point to the altered notion of authenticity 
in the age of the camera phone, encapsulated as it is 
by the internet-age slogan: ‘pics or it didn’t happen’. it 
may seem surprising that the so-called digital natives, 
brought up on image manipulation via instagram filters 
or the in-phone alteration of features such as focus or 
depth of field, and the possibility of face-swap thanks 
to the implementation of ai algorithms, would usher 
in a call for such a seemingly retrograde guarantee. 
But the statement is premised on the evocation of the 
earlier function and magic of the image (see Benjamin 
1969, Bazin 1960), coupled with its currently enhanced 
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role as an affect-building device. indeed, photographs 
increasingly function not as surfaces to be looked at and 
decoded but rather as digital gestures to be transmit-
ted via email and social media, with a view to signalling 
affection, remembrance, call for attention or loneli-
ness (see Frosh 2016). The visual retro-fetish which 
manifests itself in the repeated look of old film stock in 
digital images can perhaps be interpreted as a know-
ing embrace of authenticity as a construct and figuration, 
without relinquishing a desire for it. instagram thus 
becomes a space in which one can attempt to resolve 
the ontological impossibility of eating a cupcake and 
having a cupcake.
dukaj goes so far as to suggest that, in the times 
of ai, human life is the only auratic form of art left 
to us, especially the way it escapes the digital record-
ing and preprogrammed behaviour. he is not talking 
here about some unmediated encounter between two 
humans outside the technological setup or evoking 
similar humanist fantasies. it is the YouTube stars, pub-
licising their lives and the branded products that shape 
them, that are for him the last artists of today, turn-
ing lifestyle into an aesthetic experience while also 
externalising the knowledge about what it means to 
be human, and to behave like a human being, into the 
globally interconnected computer network. Gradually 
a new sense of ‘being human’ is therefore emerging, 
consisting of gestures, bodily movements, voice and 
language affectations, needs, desires and preferences 
drawn from the multiple data available online and then 
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transmuted by the deep learning networks into what 
counts as ‘the human experience’. But this is not a Black 
Mirror scenario in which avatars will look like us, gen-
erating a Bladerunner-like confusion over true human 
identity. rather, the YouTube-generated sense of being 
human is premised on the recognition that, instead of 
positioning the human against the machine, ai expo-
nentially amplifies the knowledge shared by marketing 
experts with regard to our desires and fantasies, while 
being much quicker and much more efficient at actu-
alising them. We can therefore suggest that AI dreams 
up the human outside the human, anticipating both our 
desires and their fulfilment. For dukaj, this state of 
events ultimately leads to a blind alley: a feeling of futil-
ity manifesting itself in ‘a shrug, a dispirited grimace, 
a sense of lazy surprise in the face of absolute banality 
on offer’ (2017). These sentiments represent for him ‘the 
homo sapiens artists’ spirit in the times of ai’.
To sum up, i want to suggest that by raising these 
kinds of existential questions with regard to both 
human identity and purposeful human creative activ-
ity when confronted by ai, we perpetuate the idea of 
the human as an old-style cybernetic system – a system 
which, even if not humanist in the sense of being 
underpinned by concepts such as soul, spirit or unique 
human creativity, was just adequately homeostatic. in 
other words, pre-ai human in this model could both 
be an artist and appreciate art because there was just the 
right amount of material and data to process in order 
for something meaningful (for that human) to emerge. 
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however, once the information barrier has been crossed 
and all the possibilities for creation have supposedly 
been exhausted in advance, even if only on the vir-
tual level, ai-driven art has become an ouroboros-like 
circle of random variations. This darker assessment of 
the current media landscape offers a rejoinder to ways 
of engaging with internet-based ai art primarily in 
terms of ‘fun’, with disappointment, boredom and an 
impulsive yearning for one more click being fun’s less 
glamorous counterparts. human artists’ and human 
publics’ ennui in the face of ai as analysed by dukaj 
could thus be interpreted as an excess of productivity: 
an outpouring of seemingly different outcomes whose 
structure has been predicted by the algorithmic logic 
that underpins them, even if not yet visualised or con-
ceptualised by the carbon-based human. The pointless 
production of difference, whereby you may not be able 
to envisage or predict all the actual outcomes but where 
you can be sure of their pointlessness, is precisely where 
the biggest problem of a large section of what counts as 
ai-based art lies today. indeed, it is not too much of an 
exaggeration to suggest that, its playful aspect aside, 
much of current ai art, especially of the computer- and 
data-based kind, ends up generating an odd combina-
tion of the fuzzy, the mindless and the bland. Thanks to 
its garish visibility, this version of ai art ends up serv-
ing as a pr campaign for corporate interests, dazzling 
viewers with the mathematical sublime of big data sets, 
rapid image flows and an intermittent flicker of light, 
sound and movement – with many arts organisations 
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jumping on the ai bandwagon because this is where the 
promise of funding, excitement and innovation lies.
Fig. 8. Mike Tyka, from Work in progress: Portraits of Imaginary People, 2017,  
http://www.miketyka.com. courtesy of the artist.
Chapter 7
Generative ai art as  
candy crush
The 2017 edition of ars electronica took place under the banner of ‘ai: artificial intelligence / das andere ich’. in the catalogue accompanying 
the event, the ars director Gerfried stocker gushed in a 
tone that could have come straight from silicon Valley 
investor publicity: ‘the latest developments in artificial 
intelligence are truly astonishing, and they will soon 
be advancing exponentially. never before has so much 
investment capital been [put] in pursuit of successful 
technologies and promising innovations’ (stocker 2017, 
16). it is thus perhaps not accidental that much of the 
artistic research around ai is facilitated and sponsored 
by the main players within what has become known 
as platform capitalism: Google, amazon, Facebook 
and apple. Much of ai art is precisely platform art: 
generating visual and algorithmic variations within 
the enclosed system while teasing the public with the 
promise of novelty. Unlike most of the installation-
based robotic art discussed earlier, this kind of ai art, 
described with the term ‘generative’, takes place across 
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computer networks. Kindly put, much of generative ai 
art celebrates the technological novelty of computer 
vision, fast processing power and connection-making 
algorithms by regaling us with a dazzling spectacle of 
colours and contrasts as well as the sheer volume of 
data. Unkindly put, it becomes a glorified version of 
candy crush that seductively maims our bodies and 
brains into submission and acquiescence. art that 
draws on deep learning and big data sets to get comput-
ers to do something supposedly interesting with images 
often ends up offering a mere psychedelic sea of squig-
gles, giggles and not very much in-between. it really is 
art as spectacle.
it is with this critical mindset, tinged with curios-
ity and fascination, that i approach much of the current 
work based on neural networks, code and algorithms 
by artists such as Gene Kogan, Mike Tyka, Memo 
akten and Mario Klingemann. Kogan’s Neural Synthesis 
was developed for the ‘creativity exhibition’ at nips 
(neural information processing systems) conference 
in 2017. The 2’41’’ video offers a psychedelic transmog-
rification of garishly multicoloured figures, faces and 
abstract patterns, slowly emerging before the viewer’s 
eyes. Kogan’s technique involves repeatedly optimising 
pixels in an image ‘to achieve some desired state of acti-
vations in a convolutional neural network’ (Kogan and 
lkkchung 2017) – i.e. a deep learning network, consist-
ing of many layers of artificial neurons, which assumes 
the data it is being fed consists of images. That ‘desired 
state’ may end up looking like a dalmatian, a starfish 
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or, indeed, a human face. The final layer in the network 
‘essentially makes a decision on what the image shows’ 
(Mordvintsev 2015). an advanced version of this tech-
nique gained recognition in 2015, when Google released 
it to the public under the name of deepdream (fig. 
12). put simply, deepdream works by identifying and 
enhancing patterns in images, leading to the algorithm 
‘finding’ human eyes or puppies in any regular photo-
graphs. The programme was originally developed ‘to 
help scientists and engineers to see what a deep neural 
network is seeing when it is looking in a given image’ 
but was quickly repurposed as a creative tool, which 
subsequently underwent various iterations. Works pro-
duced using the deepdream algorithm were described 
with the term ‘inceptionism’, ‘which derives its name 
from the network in network paper by Lin et al. [12] in 
conjunction with the famous “we need to go deeper” 
internet meme’ (szegedy et al. 2014). Yet artists as well 
as the wider public quickly got bored with what a Wired 
journalist has described as ‘Google’s trippy neural net-
work, which chews up reality and spits out slugs, dogs 
and eyes’ (Temperton 2015).
a Google scientist called Mike Tyka, who was the 
author of some of the first large-scale artworks made 
with deepdream, took some further steps with genera-
tive ai. his Portraits of Imaginary People (fig. 8), featured 
at ars 2017 and produced by generative neural nets, are 
photorealistic yet also somewhat ‘oil-painty’ images 
of humans of different sexes, ethnicities and ages. To 
create them, the artist fed thousands of photos of faces 
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from Flickr to a machine-learning programme called a 
generative adversarial network (Gan). Gans use two 
neural networks, where a neural network is basically 
an algorithm that is designed from bottom up, in a way 
that (supposedly) imitates the way the human brain 
works. The two neural networks in a Gan are placed in 
an adversarial relationship, with one tasked with gen-
erating convincing and correct input, the other – with 
controlling and improving upon this input, according to 
the truth/falsehood criteria. Their ongoing interaction 
makes both networks improve with time, learning from 
each other while trying to outdo each other in obtaining 
‘good’ results. requiring more knowledge of program-
ming than the deepdream interface did, Gans are now 
a frequent tool in the arsenal of many ai artists, espe-
cially those with science and engineering background. 
Given the source material used to train machine vision, 
it is perhaps unsurprising that canvas for such exper-
iments is frequently provided by human faces. in a 
similar vein to Tyka’s experiments, Memo akten also 
explores human portraiture. his Learning to See: Hello, 
World! is a ‘deep neural network opening its eyes for the 
first time, and trying to understand what it sees’ (akten 
2017). This is a network that has not yet been fed any-
thing. By being presented with a scanned image, via a 
surveillance camera, of a person standing in front of 
its computer host, the network attempts to figure out 
what it is seeing by identifying patterns in the infor-
mation it has received. When faced with too much 
information, the network, like its human counterpart, 
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also supposedly ‘forgets’. as the artistic output, the 
human viewers are presented with a moving set of 
transmogrified, somewhat painterly faces.
But it is the work of Mario Klingemann – a self-pro-
claimed ‘skeptic with a curious mind’ working with 
neural networks, code and algorithms – that is worth 
looking at in more detail, partly due to the attention 
it has received but also because there is something 
really intriguing happening within (and around) his 
images. another exhibitor at ars electronica 2017, he 
has also been an artist-in-residence at Google arts & 
culture: an online platform run by the silicon Valley 
giant and featuring curated collections of artworks 
and other cultural artefacts. Klingemann’s work builds 
on open source code written by engineers and shared 
with others who want to experiment with various ai 
applications, which he then tweaks for his own artis-
tic purposes. Feeding large sets of data drawn from 
publicly available digital collections such as that of 
the British Library or the internet archive into a high-
power computer, Klingemann aims to establish unusual 
encounters and connections between images and data 
points, while also visually rendering them in an inter-
esting way – with the human artist ultimately deciding 
on this interestingness or its lack. his goal is ‘to create 
algorithms that are able to surprise and to show almost 
autonomous creative behaviour’ (Klingemann) with that 
sheepish ‘almost’ obscuring what is ultimately a largely 
mechanical process, although performed at a speed 
and intensity that exceeds that of any human reader 
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of data. as a result, we get projects such as Superficial 
Beauty, featuring portraits that have been generated and 
enhanced by generative adversarial neural networks 
(Gans), or Neural Face, a collection of images of human 
faces scraped from various online repositories and pro-
grammed to ‘evolve’ into new faces. Using the neural 
network that provides biometric data for what looks 
like a human face, the artist trains the neural network 
in making new faces – which end up looking more pho-
torealistic if he trains the network on photos, or more 
‘artistic’ if he uses engravings or paintings as his train-
ing set. he also experiments with a less linear approach 
in that he not only derives faces from the face markers 
he feeds into the neural network but also derives face 
markers from pictures of faces and, finally, cross-feeds 
the data and the ‘noise’ between the two models to see 
what happens. Klingemann then combines the results 
obtained into videos showing multiple featureless faces 
seamlessly and dreamily morphing into one another 
(although with still relatively recognisable features 
of pretty white young girls), with an occasional exac-
erbation of a feature such the eye or the lip appearing 
slightly out of place.
part dali, part manga, part screensaver art, these 
rather kitsch images produced by the likes of Tyka, 
Kogan, akten and Klingemann, especially in their 
moving variety, attempt to seduce viewers with a mildly 
fascinating transformation of humanist representa-
tionalism under the banner of ‘uhm… what now?’. There 
is thus little difference, both aesthetically and in terms 
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of creativity, between Google’s deepdream, which 
comes up with surreal images by finding and enhanc-
ing patterns between various data points, and what 
Klingemann terms ‘cameraless neurophotography’, 
which produces mesmerising yet somewhat creepy 
images made from parts of other images. Turning the 
mindless generation of images into an art form, the 
artist remains seemingly unaware that his art serves as 
a blanket for technical entrepreneurs’ rather more per-
nicious, although not any less surreal, deep dreams. 
Yet, as hito steyerl argues in Duty Free Art, ‘these entities 
are far from mere hallucinations. if they are dreams, 
those dreams can be interpreted as condensations or 
displacements of the current technological disposition. 
They reveal the networked operations of computational 
image creation, certain presets of machinic vision, its 
hardwired ideologies and preferences’ (2017).
indeed, generative art of this kind is premised on 
the banality of looking, with perception understood as 
visual consumption and art reduced to mild bemuse-
ment. it therefore does something more pernicious 
than merely introduce a new ‘new aesthetic’: slightly 
uncanny, already boring. ‘[h]ardwiring truly terrifying 
jargons of cutesy into the means of production’, it enacts 
what steyerl terms ‘a version of corporate animism in 
which commodities are not only fetishes but morph 
into franchised chimeras’ (steyerl 2017). in projects of 
this kind, the artist’s goals are clearly more aligned 
with the current developmental trajectories of corpo-
rately-funded ai, even if naturalised via the language 
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of evolution. The language of evolution features prom-
inently in the gen-art boys’ discourse but theirs is a 
rather normative and linear idea of evolution under-
stood as linear progression on an upward trajectory, not 
a process of false starts, zigzags and pointless repeti-
tions. it thus fits perfectly with the technoevolutionary 
narrative of silicon Valley ‘visionaries’ and investors, 
who are all sharpening their teeth at the next supposed 
technological leap. Through both their art and their 
discourse on art, Kogan, Tyka, akten and Klingemann 
adopt a worryingly uncritical instrumentalism, where 
seemingly child-like curiosity is underpinned by the 
progressivist model of technological expansion towards 
some kind of improvement – of accuracy, data sets and, 
ultimately, art as we know it. They are thus poster boys 
for ai art as underwritten by Google in the way they 
incarnate the very ideas of progress, innovation and 
upward trajectory that drive the gung-ho progressiv-
ism of the ai 2.0 era. in their experiments that derive 
art from inputting data and noise into neural networks’ 
feedback loops, they seem unwilling, and unable, to 
pursue any of the more serious questions raised by 
steyerl in her indictment of computer vision art: ‘Which 
faces appear on which screens, and why? … Who is 
“signal,” and who disposable “noise”?’ (steyerl 2017). 
steyerl highlights the fundamentally political dimen-
sion of separating signal and noise in any kind of data 
set, with pattern recognition resonating ‘with the wider 
question of political recognition’ (2017).
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dreamy neural network art of this kind thus ulti-
mately has a pacifying effect, anaesthetising us into 
the perception of banal sameness that creates an illu-
sion of diversification without being able to account for 
differences that matter – for why and where they matter, 
when and to whom. it thus ends up enforcing a mode 
of existence that philosopher Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi has 
called a ‘neurototalitarianism’. neurototalitarianism 
manifests itself in the utter intensification of semiotic 
(but we may also add, visual) simulation, in the end 
resulting in the sensation of panic in the social – and 
individual – neuro-system. ‘in this condition of panic, 
reason becomes unable to master the flow of events 
or to process the semio-stimulations released into the 
infosphere’ (Berardi 2017). Would it be a step too far to 
state that ai art can actually be mobilised, wittingly or 
unwittingly, in the service of neurototalitarianism, using 
cutsey kittens and spaghetti with eyes to capture not 
just the attention but also the cognitive and neurolog-
ical sphere of the modern political subject? This form 
of art enforces what Berardi has described as ‘mental 
subsumption’ (2017), whereby the automation of vision 
and of cognitive activity paves the way for the emer-
gence of constantly stimulated yet passive subjectivity. 
it thus ultimately works in the service of neoliberal-
ism, a mutated form of capitalism that, according to 
Byung-chul han, ‘has discovered the psyche as a pro-
ductive force’. Yet what gets produced here is ‘mental 
optimisation’ (han 2017), for which Big data, algo-
rithms and ai serve as perfect conduits. han calls this 
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state of events a psychopolitics, which is his variation 
on Foucault’s notion of biopolitics, whereby the sub-
ject mobilises technologies of the self not to create any 
forms of freedom but rather to succumb, ‘willingly – 
and even passionately’ (2017), to auto-exploitation (fig. 
9). The brain, the mind, the eye, the heart, the finger, 
the tongue – the whole cortico-corporeal apparatus – 
all turn into a platform for the actualisation of this new 
form of psychopolitics, which drives ‘the capitalism of 
“Like”’ (han 2017). Vision and perception are constantly 
stimulated in the process with the promise of a digi-
tal caress: they are being controlled by pleasure, rather 
than by coercion or prohibition, as was the case with 
Foucault’s disciplinary model of society.
The self-quantification movement is one example 
where the self is constantly self-optimising, convert-
ing the principle of the care of the self into a form of 
labour but also into an aesthetic object in its own right. 
The process of self-optimisation is incessant, open-
ended and always in danger of losing against someone 
with a higher score – yet it is also sustained by constant 
prompts of positivity: likes on Facebook or instagram, 
pings from one’s Fitbit, retweets. For han, ‘neoliberal 
psychopolitics seduces the soul; it pre-empts it in lieu 
of opposing it. it carefully protocols desires, needs 
and wishes instead of “depatterning them”’ (han 2017). 
There is little difference in this model between ai art 
based on deep learning and neural nets, and the wider 
internet aesthetics, with gifs, kittens and the constant 
flow of data on the Twitter stream or Facebook wall 
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seeking ‘to please and fulfil, not to repress’ – but also 
being able to ‘even read desires we do not know we har-
bour’ (han 2017). The internet turns all of us into works 
of art, with our own self-aestheticisation via algorithms 
re-optimising our body and our prosthetic selves into 
a digital object of display: fully transparent, always on 
show. han proposes ‘idiotism’, a withdrawal of com-
munication and veiling oneself in silence, as the only 
salutary response to this state of events. Yet, rather than 
embrace this form of philosophical Luddism, i am more 
inspired by Berardi’s call for the emergence of new cog-
nitive abilities, or a new morpho-genesis he seeks. The 
idea here ‘is to dismantle and reprogramme the meta-
machine, creating a common consciousness and a 
common technical platform for the cognitive workers 
of the world’ (Berardi 2017).
Fig. 9. Joanna Zylinska as (not) seen by the data Faceprint identification algorithm 
developed by nexus studios, AI: More Than Human, Barbican centre, June 2019.
Chapter 8
seeing like a Machine,  
Telling like a human
artist Trevor paglen’s recent experiments with ai open up a different way of thinking about com-putation in relation to art and machine vision, 
while also revealing some limitations with regard to 
what art can and can’t do. in his image-based practice 
paglen has always interrogated how we see the world, 
focusing on the way in which the logic of total trans-
parency promoted by the socio-political apparatus 
translates into global surveillance while also creat-
ing zones of opacity that hide the actual operations of 
power. and thus in The Other Night Sky (2010-11) he drew 
on data obtained from amateur satellite observers to 
track and photograph classified american satellites and 
space debris, in Limit Telephotography (2012) he used pow-
erful telescopes to capture images of classified military 
bases, while in Deep Web Dive (2016) he photographed 
nsa-tapped underwater internet cables at the bottom 
of the atlantic. in all of those works the human-nonhu-
man assemblage was still driven by the human artist, 
who had mobilised the hybrid apparatus to reveal the 
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limitations of human vision. Through this, paglen 
raised questions about the inhumane aspects of some 
of the viewing practices installed by the current politi-
cal regimes yet hidden from general view.
The problem of seeing has been very much of interest 
to the artist in his more recent work, which engages with 
ai technology. he frames his current approach as fol-
lows: ‘over the last ten years or so, powerful algorithms 
and artificial intelligence networks have enabled com-
puters to “see” autonomously. What does it mean that 
“seeing” no longer requires a human “seer” in the loop?’ 
(in strecker non-dated). in an interview associated 
with his 2017 exhibition ‘a study of invisible images’ at 
Metro pictures in new York, paglen highlights the fact 
that the majority of images produced today are not only 
generated automatically, without human intentional-
ity or oversight, but are also intended for a nonhuman 
recipient: this or that section of the planetary compu-
tational system that Benjamin Bratton has deemed ‘the 
stack’ (Bratton 2016). The artist has in mind here photo-
graphs produced via face recognition technology which 
are increasingly used in policing, surveillance and 
access; computer vision directing the self-driving cars; 
or cameras on drones used to allow algorithm-driven 
‘killer robots’ to determine worthy targets.
paglen’s project It Began as a Military Experiment (2017) 
included in the Metro exhibition features rows of colour 
portrait photographs, showing seemingly regular sub-
jects of different genders, ethnicities and ages – with 
the display looking like an updated version of august 
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sander’s People of the 20th Century. only a very close look 
allows the viewer to detect grid-like white symbols, 
which have been superimposed on the subjects’ faces. 
From the accompanying materials we learn that the 
photos had been drawn from the so-called FereT data-
base containing thousands of photos of people – many 
of them workers at a military base in Maryland – which 
had been collected on behest of darpa (the defense 
advanced research projects agency) to help develop 
facial recognition technology. To advance the technol-
ogy, the military needed to train algorithms in correct 
pattern recognition by feeding the network thousands 
of similar faces and teaching it to recognise variations 
between them. paglen spent months going through 
the FereT database to select individual images, which 
he subsequently retouched and colour-corrected, and 
then ran them through an algorithm to identify key 
points in the faces. ‘[T]these photos represent some of 
the original faces of facial recognition – the “adams 
and eves” that nearly all subsequent facial recognition 
research has been built upon’ (in strecker non-dated). 
in this sense, they not only hint at sander’s totalising 
humanism but also reference edward steichen’s Family 
of Man photographic exhibition held at MoMa in 1955, 
whose ambition was to reveal a supposed universality 
of human experience while also promoting a soft ver-
sion of Us imperialism. and yet a strange shift occurs 
in this presumed adamism – a term roland Barthes 
used ironically in Mythologies to refer not just to the 
presupposed originary unity of ‘all men’ in steichen’s 
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exhibition that the FereT database perpetuates, but 
also to a ‘lyricism’ which immobilises humans in their 
place by making their social condition look eternal 
(Barthes 1973, 102). What is new about the FereT images 
is that they are not aimed at human eyes: as a training 
set for a facial recognition algorithm, their goal is to 
establish this commonality-in-difference for machine 
vision. indeed, these images are not meant to be seen 
at all by humans but are rather going inside the black 
box that ai has become. The fact that most ai research 
has been funded by the military, with darpa, the orig-
inal funders of internet development, also sponsoring 
‘more ai research than private corporations and any 
other branch of the government’ (Barrat 2013, 180) from 
the 1960s through to the 1990s, means that ai is liter-
ally a military project, even if developed by external 
companies and research universities. it is precisely the 
impossibility of knowing what is in the database – not 
only due to the lack of access but also due to the sheer 
physical impossibility on the part of humans to sift 
through all the data – that drives paglen’s current work.
This black-boxing of ai technology hides, for exam-
ple, the data bias of human engineers who construct the 
supposedly universal data sets. as alexander strecker, 
editor of LensCulture, wrote in his review of paglen’s 
exhibition: ‘imagine the first time a self-driving car 
has to choose between two children who have run out 
into the road, one white and one black. if the computer 
“sees” the black child as a small animal, due to the bias 
of the training sets it has been given, its choice will be 
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clear’ (strecker non-dated). Yet it is not only the ques-
tion of data bias – which some ai researchers argue can 
be overcome by feeding the system a wider set of data, 
training people in labelling the data better, making 
them undergo bias awareness training or simply paying 
them more – that emerges as a concern here. a deeper 
problem lies in the very idea of organising the world 
according to supposedly representative data sets and 
having decisions made on their basis, in advance and 
supposedly objectively. such technologies are of course 
already in use: we can mention here not only face rec-
ognition at border control and other security access 
points, but also Facebook photo tagging algorithms, 
identification of bank cheque deposits or rapid deci-
sions about credit. one might even go so far as to argue 
that what we humans perceive as ethical decisions are 
first and foremost corporal reactions, executed by an 
‘algorithm’ of dna, hormones and other chemicals 
that push the body to act in a certain way, rather than 
outcomes of a process of ethical deliberation concern-
ing the concept of good and the value of human life. as 
mentioned earlier, i am therefore reluctant to analyse 
ai developments by pitching the human against the 
machine in order to wonder whether ‘they’ are going 
to get ‘us’ or not. But i do want to throw some light on 
the very debate on ai by shifting from a polarised and 
dualist narrative to one that interrogates entangled 
human-nonhuman agency while also raising politi-
cal questions. Technologically-aware art can create a 
space for interrogating who funds, trains and owns our 
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algorithms. This interrogation is important because, as 
shown by safiya noble in Algorithms of Oppression: How 
Search Engines Reinforce Racism, ‘data and computing have 
become so profoundly their own “truth” that even in the 
face of evidence, the public still struggles to hold tech 
companies accountable for the products and errors of 
their ways. These errors increasingly lead to racial and 
gender profiling, misrepresentation, and even eco-
nomic redlining’ (noble 2018). critical projects such as 
those by paglen encourage us to ask: Whose vision is ai 
promoting? Who is doing the looking, in what way and 
to what purpose?15
paglen’s project Sight Machine (2017) was aimed at 
exploring precisely these questions. a collaboration 
with Kronos Quartet and light installation company 
obscura digital, it involved staging a concert in a san 
Francisco warehouse, accompanied by the projections 
of various bits of data driven by ai algorithms. as well 
as displaying, in frequent motion, one of the face rec-
ognition training data sets discussed above, the artist 
had installed a number of cameras in the warehouse, 
with feeds going into the video mixer and the hardware. 
The cameras then made visible on the screen behind 
the band renderings of outlines of the human mem-
bers of the band in the form of multicoloured squiggles, 
circles and squares. The artist and his team occasion-
ally turned the camera on the audience to allow them 
to see themselves being seen by the computers, with 
their faces identified as faces and also rendered as rect-
angles. The idea behind the project was to examine the 
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architecture of different computer vision systems by 
trying to learn what it was that they were seeing. Yet we 
should ask to what extent this is actually still ‘seeing’. 
and are we still talking about intelligence? or are they 
just behaviours that look like seeing and intelligence to 
us, their human interpreters?
echoing a quip that is popular with ai researchers, 
‘can the submarine swim?’, these questions are impor-
tant because the systems put in motion that enable 
computer vision and other forms of ai determine who 
and what is allowed in and what isn’t. Much translation 
work had been involved in paglen’s Sight Machine, but at 
the end of the day the performance revealed the basic 
untranslatability of data between different recipients, 
resulting from the opacity of code (from brute force 
algorithms of the 1960s systems to contemporary deep 
learning frameworks such as TensorFlow, Torch and 
caffe). it is precisely in that very gesture of attempting 
to undertake the work of translation that the incom-
patibility between different cognitive frameworks 
and different forms in which intelligence is embodied 
was revealed. The project thus succeeded and failed at 
the same time: it failed at transparency, at revealing 
(to us) what and how computers supposedly see, but 
it succeeded at unveiling this translation gap – which 
is also an epistemological and ontological gap. paglen 
himself recognised as much in the essay co-written 
with ai researcher Kate crawford, when they posed a 
seemingly rhetorical question: ‘What if the challenge 
of getting computers to “describe what they see” will 
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always be a problem?’ (2019). and even though paglen’s 
project failed the classic Marxian promise that reveal-
ing the conditions of injustice would lead to increased 
political activity and eventual liberation, that prom-
ise itself has been debunked by the public responses 
to platform capitalism. it would be naïve to think 
that people are unaware that, for example, amazon is 
spying on them, that Google tracks their every move or 
that Facebook mines their personal data for commercial 
gain, yet the percentage of those who permanently sign 
off social media or remove their personal data from the 
cloud is – and indeed can be – very slim. Yet what paglen 
unveils is precisely the fact that vision itself is chang-
ing and that we cannot ever truly see the conditions of 
our material existence. he also shows us that a new net-
work of visibility, much of which remains permanently 
obscured from human vision, has now emerged which 
has the potential to redefine radically what counts as 
visible and what doesn’t – or what counts, full stop.
We could therefore conclude that paglen’s work 
reveals the impossibility of ‘seeing it all’ on the part 
of the human, while also demonstrating how the link 
between seeing and knowing has been ultimately sev-
ered in the algorithmic culture that organises our social 
and political lives. and yet, as with his previous proj-
ects, there is something romantically futile about this 
artistic gesture, premised as it is on unveiling the dark 
machinations of ‘the stack’. To say this is not to dismiss 
his artistic undertakings but rather to suggest that the 
success of paglen’s work lies in its parergonal nature: to 
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really ‘get’ what he is showing we need to engage not just 
with the images he produces but also with the narrative 
about machine vision, the human intervention into the 
limits of the image and the discourse about art making. 
The term parergon, referring to a supplementary remark, 
additional material or ornament whose function is 
merely to embellish the main work (i.e. the ergon), has 
been immortalised in art theory by Jacques derrida. 
in his reading of Kant’s Critique of Judgement included 
in The Truth in Painting, derrida takes issue with the 
idea of a self-contained nature of the work of art, con-
veyed by the belief in its supposed intrinsic value and 
beauty, by literally bringing the work’s framing into the 
picture. ‘a parergon comes against, beside, and in addi-
tion to the ergon, the work done [ fait], the fact [le fait], 
the work, but it does not fall to one side, it touches and 
cooperates within the operation, from a certain outside. 
neither simply outside nor simply inside’ (derrida 1987, 
54). The supposedly secondary function of the fram-
ing, be it literal or conceptual, is argued to be actually 
foundational to the artwork’s existence and recogni-
tion as an artwork, as its very existence delineates and 
preserves the artwork’s identity. For derrida, a work of 
art is therefore never self-contained, it always depends 
on its parerga – frames, ornaments, commentaries – 
if it is to be recognised in its proclaimed uniqueness 
and singularity. and thus to say that paglen’s work is 
parergonal is not to criticise it for its presumed lack 
but rather to acknowledge its (perhaps knowing) reli-
ance on the grid, the network and the cloud. in other 
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words, paglen’s projects about seeing machines mobil-
ise human intelligence and machinic technology to say 
and show us something, while also revealing our own 
cognitive and political limits and blind spots. his prac-
tice does not amount to producing political art per se, but 
it does engage our sense and sensibility to reprogram 
the human cognitive-sensory apparatus – and maybe 
to open it up to a different hack.
This kind of approach inscribes itself in the post-
conceptual mode of artistic production, in that it is 
still driven by concepts, but it is also very much reli-
ant on their material enactments and visualisations. 
interestingly, in paglen’s case these enactments and 
visualisations fail by design. This is to say, they fail on the 
level of actually showing us anything meaningful – but 
this is because their role is not illustrative bur rather 
allegorical.16 paglen’s works thus serve as parables, 
revealing a hidden story, with a deeper moral meaning, 
beyond what’s on show. Tim clark has described the 
artist as ‘one of the most urgent chroniclers of our times, 
highlighting the forces that lay beyond what is immedi-
ately evident’ (2019). This allegorical method of working 
is mobilised not just in the projects discussed above but 
also in paglen’s exhibition From ‘Apple’ to ‘Anomaly’ (2019-
2020), staged at the Barbican centre’s The curve. For 
the show the artist had printed out some 30,000 pho-
tographs from imagenet, the largest and best-known 
dataset which is widely used to train computers in how 
humans see and recognise images. he then installed 
the square prints in a mosaic-like fashion, by following 
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aesthetic and associative cues: from (Magritte’s) apple to 
anomaly. The final result was a huge colourful tapes-
try which offered a visual journey through the clouds 
of images and concepts, while also producing a sensory 
overload in the viewers (or rather walkers, because the 
project required an active traversal of the gallery space 
alongside the exhibition wall to be able to take it all in, 
and this taking in could only occur in sections due to the 
curved, corridor-like shape of the space). contrary to 
the promises of the wall text, the work did not so much 
expose the algorithmic bias of the online databases used 
to construct ai training sets, or even reveal those data-
bases’ impossibly large size. But what it did do was send 
out a moral alert to visitors about the transformation 
of vision that was taking place in the wider world. From 
‘Apple’ to ‘Anomaly’ can thus be positioned as one of the 
seeing machines analysed elsewhere by the artist – not 
because it sees anything by itself or even approximates 
the way machines see, but rather because ‘machines 
become autonomous systems that intervene and are 
coercive in the world’ (clark 2019). it thus symbolises a 
larger infrastructure of perception and cognition which 
is currently being constructed at different scales – and 
which, arguably, will soon change our ways of being in 
the world, as individuals and as citizens.






Total hiT value: $35
Figs. 10a-10f. Joanna Zylinska, excerpts from View from the Win-
dow, 2018. The complete project can be seen by scanning the 
Qr code below or visiting: https://vimeo.com/344979151
Chapter 9
Undigital photography
The notion of ‘seeing machines’ referenced in the previous chapter is actually a term used by Trevor paglen to describe the contemporary con-
dition of photography. in a series of blog posts written 
for Fotomuseum Winterthur in 2014, paglen proposed 
an expanded understanding of the photographic 
medium, encompassing ‘the myriad ways that not only 
humans use technology to “see” the world, but the ways 
machines see the world for other machines’ (paglen 
2014). his definition includes various image-capture 
apparatuses, from mobile phones through to satellite 
cameras, but it also incorporates data, storage systems, 
interpretation algorithms and, last but not least, the 
technologies of perception that emerge as part of the 
networked photographic practices – and that establish 
and legitimate particular regimes of visibility. Most 
importantly, the concept of photography-as-seeing-
machines highlights the fact that to focus ‘too closely on 
individual images is entirely to miss the point’ (paglen 
2014). With this argument paglen offers a blow to the 
art-historical understanding of photography in terms 
of singular historical records and framed artefacts. it 
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is not even that digital technology has resulted in the 
supposed overproduction of images today, with singu-
lar photographs giving way to image and data flows. it 
is rather that photographs cannot be treated as discrete 
entities because they are part of the wider technologi-
cal network of production and perception: the are both 
objects to be looked at and vision-shaping technologies, 
for humans and machines. Their identity as discrete 
images is thus performatively established by the very 
acts of looking at them – but we must bear in mind that 
the ‘looker’ is not always human.
There is an affinity between paglen’s conceptuali-
sation of photography in terms of ‘seeing machines’ 
and my own notion of ‘nonhuman photography’, devel-
oped in the book of the same title (Zylinska, 2017). The 
book’s argument was premised on my conviction about 
the inadequacy of the traditional photography theory 
for analysing the image landscape today, because, as 
paglen points out, ‘susan sontag’s seminal work has 
little to say about the infrared imaging system on a 
reaper drone’ while ‘applying roland Barthes’ ideas 
to the billions of images in London’s city-wide surveil-
lance archives would be utterly absurd’ (2014). For me, 
the concept of ‘nonhuman photography’ refers to photo-
graphs that are not of, by or for the human (see Zylinska 
2017, 5), encompassing images as diverse as depopulated 
vistas, satellite pictures and Qr codes. even though 
the opening premise of Nonhuman Photography is that 
today, in the age of ccTV, drone media, medical body 
scans and satellite imaging, photography has become 
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increasingly decoupled from human agency and human 
vision, i have also suggested that even those images that 
have been taken by the human entail a nonhuman ele-
ment. This element, executed by means of technical and 
cultural algorithms, is revealed by the fact that most 
people’s wedding photographs, holiday snapshot and 
instagram feeds look uncannily similar.
The recognition of this cultural iterability allowed 
me to suggest, as i have earlier on here, that humans 
have always been technological, i.e. that we have run 
on algorithms – from dna to behavioural instructions 
developed in various cultures to legitimate and pro-
mote certain ways of doing things over others. if we 
accept this premise, we will then have to conclude that 
all manifestations of art, and specifically all images, 
starting from cave paintings, have depended on bodily 
prostheses, cognitive extensions and expanded modes 
of intelligence. My concept of ‘nonhuman photography’ 
thus arguably goes further (or deeper) than paglen’s idea 
of ‘seeing machines’ because it not only studies humans 
as seen by machines or machines that see things outside the 
human spectrum, but also because it understands humans 
as (non-Cartesian, embodied and entangled) seeing machines. 
Last but not least, it also reaches towards the geologi-
cal past, with the universe positioned as a giant camera 
making photoimagistic impressions on a variety of sur-
faces, from rocks through to skin.
Yet, rather than enter into terminological compe-
tition with paglen, whose work i greatly admire, i am 
more interested in bringing his theory of machinic 
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sight into a conversation with my own work that probes 
the algorithmic aspect of perception and vision across 
apparatuses, species and time scales. The rationale for 
this conversation is an attempt on my part to imag-
ine better ways of seeing the world at a time when it is 
being reshaped by the discourses and practices of ai. 
it is also to envisage better ways of acting in the world. 
While i acknowledge that both seeing and acting will 
be undertaken by human and nonhuman agents, the 
reflective process on what constitutes this goodness 
and what forms it may take, and also on the compet-
ing claims to its validity – depending on one’s political 
and ontological constitution – will be uniquely human. 
To enact this encounter, i want to offer a new concep-
tual figuration: ‘undigital photography’. The term is not 
fully mine: i have borrowed it from the academic dis-
cipline of computational photography, a field which 
deals with images captured and processed by means 
of digital computation rather than as a result of opti-
cal processes. ‘Undigital photography’ is the alternative 
moniker given to this new field in which ‘the snap is 
only the start’ (Kelion 2013) and where changes to focus, 
lighting, framing or depth of field can take place after an 
image has been taken. it goes without saying that com-
putation has been part of mechanical image making 
for a long time now: we can think here of photoshop 
or internal processing of jpg or even raw files by vari-
ous digital cameras. What changes with computational 
photography is the inherent instability of the outcome of 
the imaging process, with its openness to manipulation 
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constituting the very ontology of the undigital image 
– and not just a possibility aimed at professionals or 
advanced amateurs, like it was with more traditional 
digital images produced by early mobile phone or dsLr 
cameras. Yet in the term ‘undigital photography’ i also 
see a conceptual and poetic promise for rethinking 
our current frameworks and modes of understand-
ing image making as developed in both media theory 
and visual culture. The term thus offers new possi-
bilities for thinking photographically in the age of ai. 
This terminological reinscription is made partly in jest: 
as promised earlier, i aim to cut through the smoke 
and mirrors that envelop the discourses of computa-
tion and ai. But i also want to raise broader questions 
about the conditions of image making, creativity and 
labour today.
Undigital photography recognises the (human) 
history of photography: its artistic legacy, affective 
attachments and technological residues. But it repo-
sitions this history as premised on events enacted by 
human agents along the lines of technical assemblages 
– assemblages which also include humans. This repo-
sitioning is undertaken with a view to offering a more 
complex understanding of the relations of causality, 
influence and change, but also of human responsibil-
ity and the possibilities of its enactment as part of such 
assemblages. it is an attempt to respond to Flusser’s 
probing question as to what humans can do in a uni-
verse driven by geophysical forces which are not of our 
making (see Flusser 2011, 16-19) – and to explore what 
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forms human creativity can take, be it on an artistic, 
engineering or political level. This attempt also entails 
questioning to what extent such creativity can ever be 
solely human. The renewed interest in, and research 
into, ai makes such an enquiry ever more urgent.
as well as constituting the key theme of this book, 
my contribution to this enquiry has taken the form 
of an (un)photographic project that has engaged with 
‘artificial artificial intelligence’. The latter term is what 
amazon has been informally calling its Mechanical 
Turk (MTurk) platform, an online ‘marketplace’ con-
necting labour suppliers with providers worldwide. The 
‘labour’ here consists of hiTs, ‘human intelligence tasks’ 
usually involving simple mechanical actions performed 
on digital data, such as tagging photographs or filling 
in surveys, priced very cheaply (from 0.01 to 0.25 cents 
per task on average). The project basically puts humans 
in the role of machines, as it would be too impractical 
and costly to program a computer which could per-
form such tasks.
MTurk’s collective force has actually played a sig-
nificant if somewhat obscured role in the history of 
machine (aka deep) learning and ai, especially as far as 
image recognition and machine vision are concerned. 
The 14-milion-item database of photographs called 
imagenet, which pagen’s project From ‘Apple’ to ‘Anomaly’ 
discussed in the previous chapter explores, only really 
took off as a convincing and efficient collection of 
training sets after the engagement of MTurk labour. 
imagenet began its life as a relatively small database 
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of 10,000 labelled images of various objects, divided 
into twenty classes. it was launched in a modest poster 
presentation in 2009.17 Those images were aimed at 
training computers to recognise similar objects on their 
basis. Yet imagenet needed a much wider set of images 
to be effective. once social media took off, computer 
scientists under the guidance of stanford University’s 
Fei-Fei Li took the project further by being able to ben-
efit from the wide availability of ‘free’ photos across 
various platforms. however, even though they man-
aged to scrape off millions of images from the internet, 
they were still presented with the difficulty of having to 
label such a huge data set. it was the hiring of the glob-
ally distributed army of 50,000 anonymous MTurkers 
in 2007 that allowed them to accomplish this mam-
moth task, a task which could not have been undertaken 
by even the most efficient research team at any one 
institution. in time imagenet became the leading train-
ing set for computer vision. Yet these developments in 
computer vision have been premised on obscuring, to 
a large extent, the human and machinic infrastruc-
tures that assisted its development, with their mutable 
energy flows and unacknowledged perceptive and epis-
temological blind spots.18 MTurkers’ labour thus became 
part of imagenet’s ‘black box’.
in my own project, undertaken as part of the 
research for this book, i was not so much interested in 
opening up the black box of the nascent ai technology 
as in peering inside the invisible enclosure that housed 
the MTurk labour force, which assisted its emergence. i 
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thus commissioned 100 MTurkers to take one photo of 
a view from a window of the room they were in at the 
time (figs. 10a-10f). The instructions clearly stipulated 
that if there was no window in the room, they should 
go to the next available room with a window and take 
a photo from there. They were also asked not to upload 
stock photos, existing images from the web or their old 
photos. i explained that this hiT was for a research/art 
project which studied human and machinic creativ-
ity. The participants were asked to make their photo 
look beautiful, according to their own idea of what this 
meant. postprocessing was allowed but not required. 
The hiT was priced at double the Us living wage (per 
hour), which probably explains why all the tasks had 
been snapped up and fulfilled almost immediately – 
although, given that the task was to take 1-2 minutes 
on average (precisely because i wanted a somewhat 
automatic production of the scene, to be executed by 
time-poor humans in assembly with their heavily 
automated phone cameras), i could hardly be said to 
be alleviating world poverty.19 indeed, the very act of 
using MTurk for this project was not unproblematic, 
as i will show further on, and could actually be seen 
to be perpetuating unfair labour conditions world-
wide by validating amazon’s platform. The exploration 
of these issues and conditions also formed the fabric 
of my project.
i do not know where the MTurkers that responded 
to my call came from, although it is possible to make 
some guesses from the images themselves, using 
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signage, architecture and vegetation. according to a 
2018 study, ‘Most of the [MTurk] workers are from the 
Usa (75%), with india (16%) being second, followed by 
canada (1.1%), Great Britain (0.7%), philippines (0.35%), 
and Germany (0.27%)’ (difallah et al. 2018, 3). The com-
position of a group of available workers at any one 
time also depends on what time it is in different time 
zones. The geographical concentration of the platform’s 
workers is unsurprising given that, even though many 
of the advertised tasks are very simple, they require 
a command of the english language to understand 
and perform them, which puts native and near-native 
speakers at an advantage. Yet MTurkers operate anony-
mously and are only identified through their assigned 
number, creating an illusion of a fluid mobile labour 
force that forms part of the digital cloud.
The idea behind my project was to rematerialise the 
cloudy vapour behind this narrative by creating a group 
portrait of MTurkers’ locations. neither conventional 
portraiture nor landscape photography, the collective 
image-base of View from the Window offers instead a non-
comprehensive demographic snapshot of the global 
workforce, looking out. The concept and the title entail 
a return to the mythical ‘first photo’ in the history of 
photography: Joseph nicéphore niépce’s View from the 
Window at Le Gras (1826 or 1827). due to the limited sen-
sitivity of photographic materials – namely, the pewter 
plate covered with bitumen – at the time, niépce’s 
image of a view from a window of his country house 
in Bourgogne took eight hours to expose. it resulted 
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in ‘a scene which the human eye could never see’, with 
sunlight and shadow being visible on two sides of the 
buildings at left and right (see anthes in Modrak 2011, 
112). i argued elsewhere that the first image in the his-
tory of photography therefore presented a distinctly 
nonhuman vision (Zylinska 2017, 21-22), while also 
enacting a nonhuman agency at the heart of its produc-
tion. it is also for this reason that i chose niépce’s image 
as a conceptual frame for my MTurk project. The ‘arti-
ficial artificial intelligence’ of amazon’s invisible and 
distributed labour force can therefore be described as 
‘undigital’ in the sense that, even though it uses digi-
tal technology to perform at least partially digital tasks, 
simulating the work of machines in its quiet efficiency, 
it also ruptures the seamless narrative and visualisa-
tion of the machine world. it does this by bringing the 
material traces of human bodies and their locations into 
the picture, literally. The view from the window also 
shows us that there is a window in the first place (or not). 
This window takes on the form of a metal or wooden 
frame holding a glass pane (and, occasionally, curtains, 
shutters or a mosquito net) that brings in the outside 
world. it simultaneously keeps this outside world at bay, 
precisely as ‘the outside’, the place where the person 
looking out is not. Yet the window here also stands for 
the rectangular visualisation of the software interface 
patented by Microsoft and used by other operating sys-
tems as part of their user-friendly GUi – and, last but 
not least, for the computer screen behind which the 
MTurk workers sit, interfacing with the network that 
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hires them. The MTurk labour force is therefore collec-
tively framed by multiple nested windows, which both 
hold them together and keep them apart.
in her book provocatively titled book, Artificial 
Unintelligence, which deals with a misguided belief that 
computation can solve all complex social issues (see 
Broussard 2018, 11), Meredith Broussard argues that 
‘how you define ai depends on what you want to believe 
about the future’ (89). Yet, unlike Broussard’s effort to 
humanise technology and bring the human back to 
the centre of the technological assembly, View from the 
Window aims to do something different. indeed, for me 
such a well-meaning effort at humanisation can only 
ever be misguided because it is premised on severing 
the human’s constitutive relationship with technol-
ogy. What the project does offer though is a different 
vantage point for perceiving this relationship at this 
particular moment in time – and, more importantly, a 
recognition that there is a vantage point, and that the ‘view 
from nowhere’ (see haraway 1998) promoted by most ai 
designers ends up putting a very specific (white, male, 
ahistorical) human in the picture. View from the Window 
thus also suggests that, as well as break through the 
glass ceiling, (un)digital workers may be ready to start 
smashing their virtual windows at any time. how is that 
for the ‘ai breakout’ many ai researchers are scared of?
Fig. 11. Guido segni, four images from The Middle Finger Response (Crowd workers of 
the world, united in a gesture), 2013. courtesy of the artist.
Chapter 10
an Uber for art?
computer scientists djellel difallah, elena Filatova and panos ipeirotis have conducted a 28-month survey which revealed that ‘the 
number of available workers on Mechanical Turk is at 
least 100K, with approximately 2K workers being active 
at any given moment’ (difallah et al. 2018, 2). They have 
also demonstrated that ‘the MTurk workers’ half-life is 
12-18 months, indicating that the population refreshes 
significantly over time’ (2). Branded a ‘virtual sweat-
shop’, MTurk basically offers labour as performed by 
not yet quite artificial intelligence. The platform’s 
name is borrowed from the late eighteenth-century 
chess-playing automaton constructed by Wolfgang von 
Kempelen and displayed at european courts and other 
venues of prominence. in the game of magic often asso-
ciated with new technologies and the promises made in 
their name, tinted by the orientalist fantasies of the day, 
von Kempelen’s automaton featured a turban-sport-
ing sculpture (‘The Turk’) positioned above all sorts of 
contraptions that hinted at the complex mechanisms 
inside. Yet what the inside really hid was a human chess 
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master, whose intelligence was needed to power the 
illusion of a chess-playing machine.
Given that the tasks required by amazon’s low-price 
anonymous labourers are infinite, it is understand-
able why artists may flock to the platform. driven by 
opportunism, curiosity or even a desire to unveil the 
hidden conditions of global labour in the digital age, 
they have asked MTurks to ‘draw a sheep facing to the 
left’ that later made up a massive digital tapestry, paint 
small sections of a $100 bill without realising it was 
to become part of a larger picture, literally and meta-
phorically (both projects by aaron Koblin), photograph 
themselves holding a sign which revealed why they 
did this work (andy Baio) or sticking the middle finger 
at their webcam (Guido segni, fig. 11), realise webcam 
performances (eva and Franco Mattes) and even write 
poetry (nick Thurston). There is a long history of art-
ists exploring the multiple dimensions of creativity 
while challenging their own singular role in the pro-
cess by ‘crowdsourcing’ their works – from andré 
Breton’s Exquisite Corpse, which involved collectively 
assembling words and images, through to mail art, 
smart mobs and harrell Fletcher and Miranda July’s 
LearningToLoveYouMore.com, where participants 
were asked to perform simple tasks (e.g. ‘Take a picture 
of strangers holding hands’) and upload the results to 
a website (see Grover 2006, holmes 2011). What is new 
about using MTurk is that crowdsourced art is really 
an outcome of extremely cheap labour undertaken by 
those who rely on amazon’s platform for income, rather 
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than of playful participation in a shared activity. Yet 
artists sometimes alleviate their conscience by believ-
ing that they offer a diversion to workers exposed to the 
chain of otherwise mindless hiTs by allowing them to 
do something ‘creative’.
Koblin’s work has garnered particular criticism. 
Laboral, a spanish centre for art and industrial 
creation, have argued that ‘exploitation of creative 
labour, albeit in a humorous way, is built into this 
system of participatory art making’, while at the same 
time acknowledging that The Sheep Market ‘questions 
the commodification of networked “human intelli-
gence” and cultural production’ (Laboral non-dated). 
M/c elish has pointed out that in projects of this kind 
‘[t]he implications and the stakes of Mechanical Turk 
as an economic system are left untouched’ (elish 2010). 
These implications have been addressed by many schol-
ars of labour in the global networked economy, but it is 
possible to shift registers somewhat, i want to suggest, 
without abandoning the critical commitment. clare 
Bishop’s concept of ‘delegated performance’ offers a 
more nuanced reading of such practices. Bishop is not 
writing specifically about MTurk, but she does discuss 
various forms of artistic activity such as live installa-
tions and docudrama, where people hired by artists 
are expected ‘to perform their own socioeconomic cat-
egory, be this on the basis of gender, class, ethnicity, 
age, disability, or (more rarely) profession’ (2012, 91). 
rather than condemn such practices tout court in an act 
of complete political dismissal or moralistic outrage, 
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she proposes to see delegated performance ‘as an artis-
tic practice engaging with the ethics and aesthetics of 
contemporary labor, and not simply as a micro-model 
of reification’ (91). (Bishop does draw a line between 
the more multi-layered and troubling works such as 
those by Tino Sehgal, Artur Żmijewski and Elmgreen & 
dragset, and the unwittingly self-parodic ‘art-fair-art’ 
such as the recent gallery events by Marina Abramović.)
and it is precisely in ethical terms, where ethics 
stands for an openness and responsibility towards the 
other which is not yet filled in with any positive con-
tent,20 that we can read the work of many contemporary 
artists working explicitly with crowdsourced mate-
rial via acts of delegated labour, i want to argue. nick 
Thurston’s book Of the Subcontract contains poems writ-
ten by MTurkers as part of their hiT and is prefaced by 
a foreword which Marxist critic McKenzie Wark had 
commissioned, via Freelancer.com, from a ghost-writer 
in pakistan for $75. The poems veer between naïve and 
self-knowing, crafty and well-crafted, but, in being 
framed by the MTurk pricing and the time dedicated to 
the fulfilment of the task, they all serve as a basic lesson 
in classic materialism: there is no ‘pure’ aesthetic expe-
rience outside the wider social conditions of labour, 
even if the artist or the recipient want to use the work 
to create an illusion of its existence. While many of the 
poems deal with supposedly universal topics such as 
pain, love and beauty, several are knowingly self-reflex-
ive about the task – and the life – at hand:
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0.04 [written in response to the offered payment 
of 0.02 cents]
Would you do work for this measly amount?
Would you take it seriously, would it even count.
(‘Am I Blind, or Maybe Dumb?’, in Thurston 2013, 24)
00.17 [payment of 0.17 cents]
To write a poem for you
That would surely not do
For you to take it and make it your own.
(‘A Poem You Did Not Write’, in Thurston 2013, 38)
Thurston’s book thus foregrounds the MTurkers’ con-
ditions of labour, which turn them into an ‘“elastic 
staffing pool” to whom the employer has no obligation 
beyond the agreed payment’ (Thurston in Voyce 2014, 
105). clone-like in their anonymity, MTurkers are ‘dif-
ferentiated only by their listed efficiency relative to 
the efficiency of the latest Master Workers, just as all 
computers are the computer, differentiated only by 
their inbuilt processing capacity relative to the capac-
ity of the latest market-leading computers’ (Thurston 
in Voyce, 108). The artificial artificial intelligence of 
the MTurk labour force is thus both a representation 
of the labour ideal in the times of global capital flows 
and a premonition of things to come, for the majority 
of workers, in the majority of jobs and careers. Yet the 
worry that ai-driven robots will take over, that they are 
going to replace us, is often dismissed by technocapi-
talists with the breezy reassurance that new jobs will 
be created, poverty diminished, and that, as a result 
of widespread automation, ‘we’ will simply have more 
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free time. The rebranding of unemployment and pre-
carity as freedom sounds particularly ominous in the 
positive reports about the supposed desirability of the 
gig economy, with its ‘flexibility’ and ‘freedom’. in the 
aptly titled article, ‘The internet is enabling a new Kind 
of poorly paid hell’, published in The Atlantic in January 
2018, alana semuels explains:
a research paper published in december that 
analyzed 3.8 million tasks on Mechanical Turk, 
performed by 2,676 workers, found that those 
workers earned a median hourly wage of about 
$2 an hour. only 4 percent of workers earned 
more than $7.25 an hour. Kotaro hara, the lead 
author of the study and a professor at singapore 
Management University, told me that workers 
earn so little because it’s hard to secure enough 
tasks to be working every minute they’re in 
front of the computer. he says workers spend 
a lot of time looking for tasks, waiting for the 
interface to load, and trying to complete poorly 
explained tasks before deciding to return them. 
… how is it legal to compensate workers so 
poorly? The federal minimum wage in america, 
after all, is $7.25 an hour. But … crowdsourced 
workers do not have to receive the minimum 
wage because they are considered independent 
contractors, not employees. (semuels 2018)
This problem of underemployment and underpayment 
affects not only workers on labour-sourcing platforms 
such as MTurk, crowdFlower, clickworker, Toluna or 
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Fiverr, but also other actors in the ‘disruptive’ gig econ-
omy, bankrolled by silicon Valley capital, such as Uber 
and deliveroo drivers, zero-hours contract shop assis-
tants and, last but not least, casualised academic staff.
darren Wershler’s afterword to Thurston’s Of The 
Subcontract makes an important suggestion with regard 
to the force of such projects. More than as a critique 
of a particular form of creativity (in this case, poetry, 
with all its forms and conventions) or even of the eco-
nomics of MTurk, he suggests Thurston’s project can be 
read as an institutional critique of the conditions of the 
production of art, with fame and glory attached to the 
singular auteur, but with the labour and infrastructure 
provided by ‘legion’. (This applies to fine art made by 
the likes of damien hirst, to which of course there are 
historical antecedents predating the era of industrial 
capitalism – if not that of the celebration of the individ-
ual/ist human subject – as much as it does to fashion or 
entertainment media.) Wershler recognises Thurston’s 
gesture as ‘fully ironised’ ( Wershler 2013, 138), reveal-
ing as it does ‘that the once-lauded cultural value of the 
work of poets is now so close to nothing as to be indis-
tinguishable from it, and that the work of precarious 
labourers in a networked digital milieu, which is remu-
nerated far below minimum wage, without benefits or 
the collective bargaining power of unionisation, is nev-
ertheless dignified’ (138). Wershler proposes to read Of 
the Subcontract not as a solution but rather as a symptom 
of an age in which all sorts of activities are reconfig-
ured as human intelligence Tasks. This reconfiguration 
chapter 10 124
goes hand in hand with the full automation of typically 
human creative tasks such as reporting, journalism and 
data analysis, with a growing list of jobs and careers 
threatened by being lost to ai. ‘poets and professors can 
point to this change’, says Wershler, ‘but, so far, have 
not been able to move beyond it. as we are beginning 
to realise, our tasks, too, can be outsourced’ (139). This 
state of events, deemed ‘the uberfication of the univer-
sity’ by Gary hall in his eponymous book (2016b), hints 
at a near-future in which we all become ‘entrepreneurs 
of the self’, with every aspect of our lives – from inhab-
iting a room or sleeping on someone’s sofa, making 
friends and dating through to walking – monetised both 
as a ‘shareable’ good and a data point. Yet any wealth 
generated as part of this so-called sharing economy is 
‘concentrated in the hands of relatively few’, who ‘also 
centrally control the platform, software, algorithm, 
data, and associated ecosystem, deciding on pricing and 
wage levels, work allocation, standards, conditions, and 
preferred user and laborer profiles’ (hall 2016b).
significantly, hall offers more than just a critique of 
the precarious labour conditions in the digital economy 
– or of the extension of these conditions to professions 
and careers that were previously seen as safe from the 
disruptive logic of its algorithms: Wershler’s ‘poets and 
professors’. he also issues a call to arms aimed at those 
in the academic world, highlighting that the university 
– and, we may also add, its more creative variant, the 
art school – ‘provides one of the few spaces in postin-
dustrial society where the forces of contemporary 
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neoliberalism’s anti-public sector regime are still being 
overtly opposed, to a certain extent at least’ (2016b). The 
most important question we are posed with here is not 
therefore whether robots and algorithms can replace us 
as artists, poets and professors. although, to answer 
that underlying question, ‘they’ surely can – by being 
able to produce singular artefacts that will ‘take us in’, 
evoke the sensation of beauty, become popular or even 
sell well, and by producing online books, classes and 
whole courses made up of the existing and rehashed 
content that ‘will do’, for a while at least. The question 
rather is how to create conditions in which creativity 
with its accompanying institutions, especially those 
not driven by the logic of innovation, profit and capi-
tal – institutions such as public universities and art 
schools, state-owned galleries, museums and cultural 
centres – still count for us embodied humans with material 
and other needs.
The belief in the wisdom of the crowd associated 
with the optimism of the early internet era, and driven 
by the spirit of communitarianism and collaboration, 
has lost its shine in the age of global digital surveil-
lance, fake news, Twitter bubbles and the possible 
election manipulation via social media. The crowd has 
now been revealed to be not so much wise as mould-
able and subject to all sorts of exploitation. We have 
also learnt not only that ‘they’ are really watching us 
but also that we are all doing it to one another: we are 
all MTurks in Jeff Bezos’ or Mark Zuckerberg’s digital 
factories. crowdsourcing therefore becomes a form of 
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crowd-mobbing. and thus, even if i argue that we have 
always been artificially intelligent, the specific histori-
cal and cultural labour practices of humans at a given 
point in time do matter. View from the Window thus can 
be seen as an indictment of inhumane labour prac-
tices, of the supposed ease with which an erasure of 
the human is being enacted. in its photographic legacy 
and epistemological ambition to see otherwise, it casts 
light on the lingering shadows of the globalised digital 
labour market. presented as diptychs in an automated 
photobook, the project foregrounds the mediation pro-
cesses shaping the production of knowledge, while 
also revealing the human signal points involved in the 
process. We see in them different labour distribution 
from what look like the suburbs in the Us, possibly in 
india, maybe somewhere in Latin america. Through 
the uneasy parallelism of the image pairs, the work 
asks whose interests are bring represented – and who 
can afford to be creative, where, when and for how long.
The defence of art practices and institutions for the 
human offered in this chapter has little to do with any 
residual humanism, a desire to preserve ‘our human 
uniqueness’, ‘our sense of beauty’ or any other human-
ist niceties of this kind. instead, it has to do with asking 
poets and professors to keep fighting against the uberfi-
cation of the university and the art school, of knowledge 
production and art production. With View from the 
Window, and the wider project of undigital photography, 
i thus want to show that, even though we are all entan-
gled in algorithms, it matters how we use them, what 
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visions and vistas they will be made to produce, who 
will get to see them, who (or what) will takes the picture, 
of what, in what circumstances, to what purpose and for 
what price. Building on the legacy of the term in com-
puter science, undigital photography thus becomes for 
me a way of reframing the picture after it’s been taken, 
of looking askew and anew, of refocusing and re-zoom-
ing on what matters, and of rethinking what matters to 
begin with. it is also a way of seeing photography and 
image making as a practices that are inherently unfin-
ished. and thus, even though View from the Window does 
point to the constraints of globalised outsourced labour, 
it also returns agency and pleasure to the workers as pro-
ducers of worlds and worldviews. Through this, it echoes 
Bishop’s conviction that ‘people relentlessly exceed the 
categories under which they have been recruited’ (2012, 
111).21 Moving beyond the uniqueness of the single image 
on a gallery wall or the predictability of the instagram 
flow, the project of undigital photography becomes an 
ethico-political opening towards the unknown, coupled 
with a demand for this knowledge not to be computed 
too quickly.
Fig. 12. William henry Fox Talbot’s 
Lace from The Pencil of Nature, 1845 – an 
image that arguably hints at photog-
raphy’s quintessentially algorithmic, 
pattern-based legacy (Batchen 2001, 
169; Zylinska 2017, 182) – remedi-
ated by Joanna Zylinska via Google’s 
deepdream, 2018.
Chapter 11
From net art and post-internet 
art to artificially intelligent art 
– and Beyond
having looked at some specific examples of ai art, including my own attempt to engage with the issue on a practical level, in this chapter i 
begin to emerge on the other side of the book’s funnel-
like structure by opening up once again towards some 
bigger issues concerning human and nonhuman cre-
ativity. in chapter 5 i considered robotic art, and its 
experiments in machinic creativity, as a predecessor of 
ai-driven art. here i want to situate ai art within the 
lineage of some earlier forms of media art that have 
engaged with computer networks, such as net art and 
post-internet art.
having burst onto the media scene in the early to 
mid-1990s, net art consisted of works made on and for 
the internet by individuals and collectives who had 
an advanced understanding of the new medium – and 
who were keen to explore this medium in an irreverent 
and critical way. part artists, part activists, net artists 
had a sharp understanding of the potential of the new 
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medium and of its yet undefined boundaries and modes 
of operation. The net art moment was generative and, 
inevitably perhaps, short-lasting. When the term ‘post-
internet’22 art started appearing in gallery writeups and 
art blogs in the early 2010s, it referred to work produced 
by artists who had come of age surrounded by digital 
technology – and whose sense of novelty and curiosity 
about the digital medium was therefore less pronounced 
than that of the previous generation of net artists.23 The 
gradual immersion of not just artists but also the wider 
population in the digital ecosystem of the internet, cou-
pled with the simplification and automation of digital 
interfaces, brought with it more than just greater ease 
with technological apparatuses and infrastructures, the 
sense of being ‘always on’ and having much of culture 
available ‘on tap’. it also arguably led to the vanishing 
of the Brechtian Verfremdungseffekt24 with regard to digi-
tal technology, precisely because the digital milieu had 
turned out not to be so alien any more, at least on the 
surface. instead, the so-called ‘digital natives’ began 
to swim through the waters of digital technology like 
the aquatic creatures from an anecdote recounted by 
david Foster Wallace in a 2005 college commencement 
speech. on being greeted by an older fish swimming 
past them, ‘Morning, boys, how’s the water?’, the two 
young fish could only respond with: ‘What the hell is 
water?’ (Wallace 2008). With this anecdote, Wallace 
wanted to convey to the students the importance 
of becoming more aware of their surroundings: the 
‘default setting’ they use to make their way through the 
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world, the ideologies that shape this world, the myths 
and meanings transmitted by those ideologies.
Much of the discussion around ‘post-internet’ art, 
encapsulated by artist artie Vierkant’s 2010 essay, ‘The 
image object post-internet’, focused precisely on this 
tension between familiarity and ignorance, with art-
ists stepping in to deliver a critical commentary on 
the (by then overly familiar yet still strange) digital 
milieu. That commentary took the form of blogposts, 
pamphlets and panels but it also extended to the pro-
duction of artworks which took their digital provenance 
for granted while exploring their uncertain and hybrid 
ontology: from oliver Laric’s 3d-printed casts of classic 
Greek and roman sculptures through to Jon rafman’s 
alien-looking busts covered with digitally remastered 
works of picasso, rothko or Kandinsky, images of which 
had been taken from the internet. post-internet art was 
thus ‘inherently informed by ubiquitous authorship, 
the development of attention as currency, the collapse 
of physical space in networked culture, and the infi-
nite reproducibility and mutability of digital materials’, 
with artists taking on ‘a role more closely aligned to that 
of the interpreter, transcriber, narrator, curator, archi-
tect’ (Vierkant 2010). it is therefore rather ironic that 
the hybrid materiality of post-internet art was quickly 
absorbed by the logic of the traditional gallery circuit, 
with art dealers and gallery owners breathing a sigh of 
relief because they once again had physical objects to 
show and sell.
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The demands of ai art replicate those of early net 
art to some extent, in the sense that a certain level of 
technical expertise is required to be able to get involved 
in the practice. at the same time, the conditions of its 
production are very different. The political economy of 
the internet and of the wider technological infrastruc-
tures has changed, with the utopian idea of the world 
wide web as the commons giving way to proprietary 
warfare between tech companies, media moguls and 
political actors over the ownership of data, machines, 
bodies and minds. There is therefore less scope for the 
cultivation of the ‘tinkering ethos’ of net art, with its 
hacker affinities and collaborative spirit. Much of cur-
rent ai art, driven by the engineering mindset, comes 
from a very different place: sometimes it literally comes 
from Google. The alienation effect caused by ai tends to 
be swept away by visual transmogrification that actu-
ally prevents understanding rather than enhancing it. 
indeed, as i argued earlier on in this book, much of the 
current ai art – or at least the works that gain visibility 
at festivals, fairs and with the wider public – has been 
reduced to a pure spectacle, underwritten by the fol-
lowing message: you don’t need to understand it because you 
are already in it. it could therefore be described as ‘arti-
ficially intelligent art’. even though the conditions of 
the emergence of ai to some extent resemble those of 
the early days of the internet in terms of the need for 
advanced know-how if one is to delve into the emergent 
technological infrastructure, the anthropomorphised 
net art 133
(and often feminised) banality of digital interfaces cre-
ates an illusion of familiarity and comfort.
such ‘artificially intelligent art’, i.e. art which 
reduces expertise to engineering competency while 
foreclosing on the (artist’s and user’s) critical engage-
ment at the expense of offering a stunning visual 
spectacle, is of course not the only way of creatively 
engaging with ai, even if this is the kind of art that 
features prominently in ai-focused shows. Lauren 
Mccarthy’s project Lauren! offers a different take on 
artificial intelligence, both as a technology and dis-
course. The artist installs custom-designed networked 
smart devices such as cameras, microphones, switches, 
door locks and taps in willing participants’ homes. she 
then engages in the constant monitoring of them, while 
being of assistance in response to requests to switch 
on the light or advise whether someone needs a hair-
cut. Through these banal acts of digitally-mediated 
outsourcing of everyday activities, Mccarthy attempts 
‘to become a human version of amazon alexa, a smart 
home intelligence’ (Mccarthy 2017) for people in their 
own abodes. The artist explores human-machine 
interaction through the lens of playfulness, irony and 
pastiche, demystifying the grand promises behind 
some of ai, while also raising the question of the willing 
suspension of privacy – which only starts feeling weird 
when the spying is undertaken by a ‘human alexa’. she 
explains that people ‘are usually expecting more tech-
nical tricks at first, a real sci-fi experience. But much 
like smart homes of today, i mostly do what they could 
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do themselves – things like flipping switches, playing 
music, and looking up answers. … By allowing these 
devices in, we outsource the formation of our identity 
to a virtual assistant whose values are programmed by 
a small, homogenous group of developers’ (Mccarthy 
2018). While foregrounding the narrowness of algo-
rithms and the vested interests of tech companies in 
selling us all those digital butlers, Mccarthy raises 
broader questions about how ‘individuation’ happens 
in the age of ai: i.e. how we become human in rela-
tion with technical objects. The technical origin of 
the human has been posited by philosophers such as 
Gilbert simondon and Bernard stiegler, with individ-
uation being understood by the latter as an ongoing 
process of an individual emerging from a techno-social 
ensemble, rather than creating this ensemble ex nihilo. 
‘simondon says that if you want to understand the indi-
vidual, you need to inscribe the individual in a process 
of which he is only a phase’ (stiegler and rogoff 2010). 
For stiegler, multiple individuals are permanently in 
the process of being constituted (and re-constituted), 
relating to and being dependent on, one another – 
with not all of those ‘others’ always being human (see 
stiegler 1998 and simondon 2016). What Mccarthy’s 
project therefore allows us to interrogate in this ongo-
ing process of human becoming (with) ai is what kind 
of technology we enter into a relationship with, in 
whose interest, and to what effect and purpose. she also 
implores us to ask: What kind of ‘phases’ are constituted 
through ai encounters? What kind of ai emerges from 
those encounters?
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Through engaging in a series of banal everyday 
tasks Mccarthy reveals the uncomfortable fact that 
the ‘The scale of resources required is many magni-
tudes greater than the energy and labor it would take 
a human to operate a household appliance or flick a 
switch’ (crawford and Joler 2018). each such ‘small 
moment of convenience’, to use Kate crawford and 
Vladan Joler’s term, ‘requires a vast planetary network, 
fueled by the extraction of non-renewable materials, 
labor, and data’ (crawford and Joler 2018). We are all 
unpaid labourers in the ai industry, Mccarthy seems 
to suggest, being seduced by promises of convenience, 
assistance or simply ‘fun’ to engage on a daily basis in 
servicing the data economy, finetuning its algorithms 
and expanding its reach. as crawford and Joler point 
out, ‘in the dynamic of dataset collection through plat-
forms like Facebook, users are feeding and training the 
neural networks with behavioral data, voice, tagged 
pictures and videos or medical data’ (2018). We could 
therefore suggest that Mccarthy denaturalises ‘the dig-
ital water’ of ai technology for us by shifting some of 
the labour of the technological ensemble to the human 
– who becomes a witness, a spy, a police(wo)man and a 
moral conscience as part of her act. With this, she can 
be said to be challenging silicon Valley’s delusionism 
and hydrophobia, which i defined in chapter 3 as the 
wariness of the elemental side of media technology. By 
implicitly responding to the anthropocene imperative, 
Mccarthy shows us an opening towards another 
engagement with ai – and towards another world that 
may just about be possible.
Fig. 13. Katja novitskova, detail of installation Pattern of Activa-
tion (Mamaroo nursery, dawn chorus), from exhibition for 
preis der nationalgalerie at hamburger Bahnhof, Berlin, 2019. 
installation photography by def-image. courtesy of the artist 
and Kraupa-Tuskany Zeidler.
Chapter 12
ai as another intelligence
While Mccarthy wants to make the digital everyday uncomfortable, Katja novitskova seemingly has the opposite goal. in the fore-
word to her 2010 edited art book, Post Internet Survival 
Guide, the estonian artist writes: ‘the internet is an 
invisible given, like roads or trees, and is used to navi-
gate not just information but also matter and space. The 
notion of a survival guide arises as an answer to a basic 
human need to cope with increasing complexity. in the 
face of death, personal attachment and confusion, one 
has to feel, interpret and index this ocean of signs in 
order to survive’ (novitskova 2010). challenging our 
supposed seamless immersion in digital culture, she 
wants us to see the water – through which she shares 
with Lauren Mccarthy the desire to denaturalise our 
environment. novitskova took this spirit to her project, 
If Only You Could See What I’ve Seen with Your Eyes (fig. 13), 
first exhibited at 57th Venice Biennale in 2017 and then 
presented in different iterations at KUMU in estonia 
and the Whitechapel Gallery in London in 2018. The 
raw material of novitskova’s practice comes from the 
flow of images available on the internet: a space the 
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artist describes as ‘an exciting digital jungle’ (Lavrador 
2017a, 40). The project explores the incredulity of sci-
entific knowledge and perception, engaging human 
and nonhuman vision to tell a playfully chilling story 
about a future that may have already happened. in the 
post-internet spirit of the artist’s earlier work, there are 
objects everywhere on display: from an eyeless pho-
tocopied polar bear cutout through to wires wriggling 
like serpents on the floor, flashing lights at us. in an 
attempt to provide order to this cornucopia of things 
that look like they’ve been photocopied or 3d-printed 
from the internet, the exhibition space teems with 
labels, descriptions, snippets of information and bits of 
data – from the extinction diagram to ominous-sound-
ing messages such as ‘bias encoded’, ‘mania phase’ and 
‘wild type mutant’. Yet, moving from room to room, we 
are none the wiser, for which we only have ourselves to 
blame as we allow ourselves to be distracted by a nature 
video or a revolving piece of shimmering perspex.
novitskova’s project feels like a spoof version of the 
‘artificially intelligent’ work which mesmerises and 
seduces the viewer. Yet there is no visual seduction here: 
instead, the visitor to her strange archive of images and 
objects is faced with a set of puzzles. What are these 
electronic cradles doing here? and what’s happened 
to the human babies they were meant to be cradling? 
What do the alien-like creatures hovering above them 
stand for? Like a funnier version of Kazuo ishiguro’s 
Never Let Me Go, novitskova’s post-internet dystopia has 
been described by Toke Lykkeberg as ‘art for another 
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intelligence’ (Lykkeberg 2017, 28). The artefacts included 
in the exhibition may cause a sense of information over-
load in a human visitor, but algorithms will be able to 
detect immediately what a given piece of data indicates. 
as Lykkeberg points out, ‘what the viewer therefore 
encounters is nothing but a meeting with their own 
ignorance; an ignorance that might however leave us 
with the glimmer of a feeling that another intelligence 
might yet get it’ (29). novitskova’s work offers a pre-
monition of the world to come, a world in which not 
only the majority of images are not being taken with 
a human viewer in mind – an issue that preoccupies 
Trevor paglen too – but also one in which machines con-
stantly perceive, communicate with and exist for other 
machines. Lykkeberg describes novitskova’s project as 
looking as if it had been ‘made by and for who’s next’ 
(40). We could therefore perhaps suggest that, draw-
ing on nonhuman databases and modes of perception, 
novitskova creates work for an artificial intelligence 
which is not here yet, inviting a speculation on the 
future of different species. This is ai read as another 
intelligence. in this context, her extinction diagrams 
copied from the internet gain a new dimension – and a 
new audience.
in The Death of the PostHuman: Essays on Extinction 
claire colebrook raises a number of thought-pro-
voking issues:
What happens if one thinks of the vision of no 
one, of the human world without humans that 
is still there to be seen? What remains might 
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still take the form of ‘a’ vision or referring eye 
– the scene of a human world as if viewed with-
out any body. The positing of an anthropocene 
era (or the idea that the human species will have 
marked the planet to such a degree that we will 
be discernible as a geological strata) deploys 
the idea of human imaging – the way we have 
already read an inhuman past in the earth’s 
layers – but does this by imagining a world in 
which humans will be extinct. The anthro-
pocene thought experiment also alters the 
modality of geological reading, not just to refer 
to the past as it is for us, but also to our present 
as it will be without us. We imagine a viewing 
or reading in the absence of viewers or readers, 
and we do this through images in the present 
that extinguish the dominance of the present. 
(colebrook 2014, 28)
colebrook identifies a paradox at the heart of much of 
‘anthropocene art’ being produced today in response to 
climate change and the threat of extinction of various 
species – including our own. Banal representational-
ist works aside, even the more experimental artistic 
practices inevitably end up reaffirming the cognitive-
sensory apparatus of the human as reader, perceiver 
and ‘experiencer’. Yet many of the more interesting 
works, amongst which i locate novitskova’s project, 
do attempt to enact a defamiliarisation of not just ‘the 
environment’ (by showing it as damaged, disappear-
ing or already gone) but also of us humans as recipients 
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of sensations from the environment conceived in a 
broader sense – and of which we are part. it is indeed in 
that latter practice of imagining a world for a different 
recipient that a radical critical gesture can be identified.
We could therefore perhaps argue that some of 
the most interesting work that engages with artifi-
cial intelligence today occupies that parergonal space 
we identified earlier in paglen’s image-based practice. 
Yet its force lies somewhere else than in an attempt to 
reveal the mechanisms of power behind the system. ‘in 
many cases, transparency wouldn’t help much’ anyway, 
as crawford and Joler point out, because ‘without forms 
of real choice, and corporate accountability, mere trans-
parency won’t shift the weight of the current power 
asymmetries’ (crawford and Joler 2018). Whether shift-
ing such weight is an achievable or even desirable task 
for art is a topic for a different project, although my 
argument – and that of the Media : arT : WriTe : 
noW book series in which it is placed, with the sense 
of urgency encapsulated by its title – does share post-
internet art’s embracing of the conviction that ‘art is 
a social object’ (Vierkant 2010). The point i am making 
here rather conveys a suspicion on my part towards 
the more bombastic claims with regard to art’s effi-
cacy in solving social ills, ‘empowering’ communities 
or ‘causing’ change by revealing injustice. This is not 
to say that art should not ever attempt to do the latter, 
only that artists themselves could perhaps curb some-
what their own exuberant beliefs and pronouncements. 
The efficacy of art that engages with ai lies perhaps 
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first and foremost in its ability to redraft the concep-
tual and discursive boundaries of human perception, 
human value and human cultural practice, while draw-
ing us as its human recipients into the recognition of 
our becoming (with) machines. such art can also make 
our human intelligence look inherently artificial – not 
only because it relies on technological prostheses such 
as canes, phones and implants to accomplish things but 
also because it is a product of relations, or, as colebrook 
puts it, because ‘we are only organizing relations. There 
is not a self who perceives; there are perceptions, from 
which something like a self is constituted’ (colebrook 
2014, 17-18). With this, she challenges the pre-mod-
ern view of the human (which we have never fully left 
behind) that elevates the human above the other species 
by seeing us as ‘more than’ just animalistic appetites, 
and that understands our human mode of being as 
being ‘responsible for out organizing relation to the 
world’ (17). For colebrook, echoing the work of philos-
ophy developed by henri Bergson and Gilles deleuze 
but also picked up by some sections of cognitive sci-
ence, perceptions and images precede the emergence of 
the self – which is only constituted through perceiving 
and imagining.
intelligent work on artificial intelligence could 
therefore perhaps attempt to sever that link between 
the work of art and human vision, going beyond the 
mere aesthesis of human experience to open up the prob-
lem of the universe itself as sentient. ‘it is not the case 
that we begin life as observing, representing beings who 
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then become through receptivity. rather, in the begin-
ning is a dynamic and world-oriented receptivity from 
which organised cognition, and the sense of the self 
as subject or man emerges. it is from a primary open-
ness to the world, a primarily sensed world, that there 
emerges the sense of one who sees’ (colebrook 2014, 
20). Yet how this intelligence will be enacted, what rela-
tions it will enter into and what modulations they will 
gain at a given moment in time turns into an aesthetic 
and ethical problem for us transient but not-yet-extinct 
humans, here and now.
Fig. 14. partial screenshot from browser of the t-sne Viewer 
applied to a grid of animal images, available in the ‘demos’ 
section of the ml4a (Machine Learning for artists) open-
source/community tutorial website. T-sne stands for a 
‘t-distributed stochastic neighbor embedding’ and is an algo-
rithmic technique, developed by Laurens van der Maaten and 
Geoffrey hinton, which is particularly useful for the visualisa-
tion of high-dimensional data sets.
Future art, art’s Future:  
a conclusion
Through its design philosophy and the ideas fuelling its application, ai invites speculation about the future: not just the future of art but 
also our human future. in AI Art i have taken up this 
invitation by attempting to explore a wider horizon of 
futurity opened up by both technologies and discourses 
of ai. Yet my book is very much anchored in the pres-
ent moment. it looks specifically at art being made 
with, around or in response to the current develop-
ments in robotics, machine vision and deep learning, at 
a time when ai research has emerged rejuvenated from 
the ‘winter’ period of the late 1980s-1990s and is now 
once again a growing field. as already stated, the field’s 
growth has been accompanied by voluminous promises 
– and multiple threats. as much as in the artefacts pro-
duced for display across different platforms, media and 
institutions, i have been interested in the financial, rhe-
torical and affective investments in ai 2.0. My ambition 
in this book has therefore been to look at ai-driven art 
here and now, while situating it in the context of wider 
socio-political and ecological issues. it has also been 
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to address, implicitly, the following questions: if ai is 
a game changer, what is actually the game? and who 
runs the game parlour? an inquiry into what future ai 
art will look like therefore necessarily has to consider 
a much bigger yet also impossible to answer question 
(unless attempted on the level of speculative fiction) of 
what everything else will look like. and, following that, of 
who, or what, will be doing the looking.
on a more modest scale an attempt to address the 
future of art and other creative forms driven by ai has 
been made by Lev Manovich is his short 2018 book AI 
Aesthetics. Manovich points out that already today many 
of us rely on ai ‘to automate our aesthetic choices (via 
recommendation engines)’ or even engage in aesthetic 
production (e.g. by relying on algorithms embedded in 
our mobile phones’ software to produce professional-
looking photos with great ease). he also claims that 
in the future ai ‘will play a larger part in professional 
cultural production’ (Manovich 2018). Much of what 
he proposes is based on the previously discussed idea 
of computers being better at processing large data sets 
and seeing connections that may not be obvious for the 
human, although he is aware that those connections 
may not actually be recognisable, or simply interesting, 
for the human. There is, however, a foundational blind 
spot entailed in Manovich’s proposition that ai may 
‘suggest new ways of seeing culture’ (Manovich 2018), 
which is premised on ai running its operations silently 
in the background of the ensemble, with the consti-
tutive parts of that ensemble – ‘humans’, ‘perception’, 
Future art, art’s Future: a conclusion 147
‘valorisation’, ‘culture’ – remaining intact. Unless we are 
satisfied with the rather superficial observations about 
the colour palette of different films or the typology of 
smiles in selfies posted on instagram, and with the 
constant deferral of critical interpretation of not just 
the data but the very technology and idea of producing 
and displaying the data (see hall 2016a, 43-55), we have 
to conclude that Manovich’s project of ai enhancing 
variability is rather limited in what it is able to reveal. 
The question about an increase in ‘aesthetic variabil-
ity’ as a result of ‘ai integration in cultural production 
and reception’ (Manovich 2018) thus actually misses 
the point because it is premised on a static notion of 
both culture and the human subject. in other words, 
Manovich’s project of ai aesthetics (which is an exten-
sion of his cultural analytics)25 remains oblivious of the 
fact that data does not just map things out as they objec-
tively are prior to being mapped, but in fact constitutes 
reality. so, instead of envisaging The human 2.0 as a 
producer and recipient of ai art in terms of a slightly 
expanded and diversified version of the current human, 
what would it mean to think seriously about the future 
of ai – for art, for human sensation and experience, 
and for the world as we know it, in all its nonhuman 
entanglements?
alongside the ‘more of the same but bigger’ trend, 
alternative scenarios for ai futures have swung from 
dystopian stories about an ai breakout and the subse-
quent human enslavement and extinction, to utopian 
visions in which all labour and drudgery will be 
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eliminated and all humans will be free to pursue their 
passions and exercise their creativity. But it is not so 
much ai futures that should worry us but rather the 
ai present: a time when not only do we have access to 
more variegated data but also when we ourselves have 
all become data subjects, with our ‘behavioural sur-
plus’ constantly feeding into the machinery of what 
shoshana Zuboff calls ‘surveillance capitalism’ (see 
Zuboff 2019). The question is therefore whether our 
future has already been spent or whether it can still be 
redeemed. in his book Futurability: The Age of Impotence 
and the Horizon of Possibility, with which i opened my line 
of enquiry in this volume, Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi has pos-
tulated ‘the multiplicity of immanent possible futures’ 
(Berardi 2017). The present moment, with its ecologi-
cal and economic destructions, and the material and 
discursive havoc wreaked upon our planet, seems to 
suggest humanity is on a downward trajectory, that it 
has already ordered in its own expiration. Yet, contrary 
to the predictions of the various fetishists of the apoca-
lypse, i want to follow Bifo in arguing that our shared 
future has not yet been totally spent, irrevocably con-
quered or deterministically designed. and so, amidst 
the ruin of our current political thought, a possibility 
of another, more utopian, future can perhaps be sought 
and fought for.
This possibility of envisaging a different future and 
painting a different picture of the world may require us 
to extend an invitation to nonhuman others to join the 
project and help redraft its aesthetic boundaries. pierre 
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huyghe’s UUmwelt could be seen as an attempt to achieve 
precisely this. The work, displayed at the serpentine 
Galleries in London in 2018-2019, presented visitors 
with multiple Led screens showing flickering blurry 
images of different classes of beings and objects. The 
exhibition was set up as an environment (or Umwelt, fol-
lowing the biosemiotician Jakob von Uexküll’s term, to 
which huyghe added another U in a playful attempt at 
defamiliarisation, breech or even negation) made up of 
human, animal and technological agents. specifically, it 
was constituted by deep neural networks, image data-
bases serving as learning material for those networks, 
scans of human brains, flies buzzing around the gal-
lery while getting trapped in the visitors’ hair and hats, 
and the visitors themselves – as well as layers of his-
tory and art history, visualised as dust scraped off the 
gallery’s walls. This additional U of the title was meant 
to signal the internal discord of any environment as a 
dynamic in which many entities are co-present but do 
not perceive the world in the same way or actually even 
share that world in any meaningful sense of the word.26 
The images presented on the screens were supposedly 
the outcome of a translation process undertaken by the 
neural networks, which attempted to interpret the data 
from human fMri brain scans and produce a sequence 
of pictures on that basis. UUmwelt was thus an attempt 
for a computer to see the way humans see, and thus to 
enact an encounter between two kinds of intelligence, 
with all the poetic and technical ambivalences this 
exercise in inevitable mistranslation entailed.
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The serpentine’s environment contained multiple 
ecologies of different rhythms and scales interacting 
with one another, often inadvertently and indifferently, 
largely outside or even beyond human intentional-
ity and control. The neural networks involved in the 
creation of novel images on the basis of familiar ones 
opened up the possibility of seeing otherwise – for 
both the machine and the human. nonhuman vision 
became a much-needed corrective to the humanist 
viewpoint, with its perspectival mastery and posses-
sive gaze. indeed, UUmwelt revealed the incompatibility 
of visions of different species, while foregrounding the 
uncertainty and tenuousness of environmental coex-
istence. experimentation with seeing otherwise, and 
with exploring seemingly incompatible environments – 
not just between humans and machines but also across 
the human-nonhuman spectrum which is always 
already biotechnological (geological faultlines, species 
boundaries, immigration lines, legality, walls, borders) 
– became a metaphor for our current socio-political 
moment, in all its planetary specificity and fragility. 
as huyghe himself put it: ‘You set conditions, but you 
cannot define the outcome…’ (huyghe 2018).
The immanence of multiple possible futures does 
not thus come with any guarantees. indeed, some future 
scenarios have been embedded, developed and funded 
better, bringing in an era of what hito steyerl has called 
an artificial stupidity, ‘a mediocre and greedy version 
of the sublime machine intelligence intended to ele-
vate and improve human life’ (steyerl 2018). Yet even 
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if technology, including ai, cannot be seen as a fix, nor 
should it be reduced to the role of a demon. critical and 
speculative ai work shows the limits of our vision, of 
our viewpoints and standpoints. indeed, it shows them 
precisely as viewpoints rather than as absolute truths. 
image production unfolding between these two kinds 
of intelligence reveals that our human intelligence is 
always already plural, with us being entangled with 
microbes, fungi, dna fossils, cosmic dust as well as 
layerings of culture, upbringing, personal and socio-
cultural umwelt. ai projects of this kind can remind 
us that ‘the way we interpret the world is specific only 
to us’ (huyghe 2018). The multiplicity and fragmentari-
ness of the UUmwelt images, shown in rapid succession, 
always in a different arrangement, reveal that there 
may be no unified ‘us’ either, for better or for worse.
‘We’ thus find ourselves at a curious moment in time, 
a time when ai research has woken up from its many 
winters and is being touted as both the ultimate threat 
and the ultimate promise. in the final paragraphs of this 
book i would like to loop back to this book’s opening 
questions – questions about the ontological and techno-
logical specificity of ai art, about its purpose and about 
the present and future audiences for such art. They all 
lead to the fundamental question concerning the very 
possibility of art’s existence after ai – and, indeed, of the 
existence of anything else. having posed so many big 
questions throughout the course of this slim volume, it 
may seem unfair to leave them here without some more 
definitive answers. however, the main idea behind my 
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book has been to show how the very act of questioning 
can equip us with tools for cutting through the smoke 
and mirrors surrounding the ai hype, with its machinic 
visions and warped dreams. and thus the question of 
what art ‘after ai’ and, more broadly, posthuman art, 
could look like perhaps requires a reassessment of the 
standpoint from which this question can actually be 
asked, coupled with the rescaling of our human world-
view, here and now. it also requires a reflection on the 
cultural, social and economic dimension of our human 
practices, including that of ‘art’, with all its historical 
assessments, financial valuations, collective sensations, 
singular pleasures and, last but not least, market and 
stylistic inflations.
a return to the human scale in the closing pages of 
this book must not be confused with a desire to reinstate 
humanism, or posit human modes of assessment, anal-
ysis and appreciation as dominant or superior. indeed, 
as we know from recent work in cognitive psychology, 
evolutionary biology and neuroscience, intelligence and 
perception can be found across the existent evolution-
ary spectrum, at levels much more complex and more 
developed than we have realised for centuries, even if 
they do not always present themselves to us humans 
as such. so it is not a matter of just inviting ‘others’ to 
our human cognitive and sensory circle, or expanding 
the definition of art so that ‘they’ can be included too. 
My closing proposal is actually much more modest: 
we need to open up the human sensorium to other 
forms of intelligence and perception, to recognise our 
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entanglement with creatures and machines, to look 
around, askew. This opening needs to involve our rec-
ognition of the human capacity for telling stories, 
having visions and dreaming dreams. Yet it also has to 
take up the ethical task of acknowledging our ability to 
reflect on those stories, visions and dreams critically, 
while widely awake. Because, as donna haraway has 
poignantly highlighted, ‘it matters what thoughts think 
thoughts. it matters what knowledges know knowl-
edges. … it matters what stories tell stories’ (2016, 35). 
in other words, it matters what we see, show and tell, 
about whom, with what, and why. art is one human 
practice where the mattering of matter, and of matters 
that (should) matter, can be explored in an affective, 
effective and non-moralistic way.

(art) Gallery of Links
This is a list of links to the online versions of the art projects discussed in the book, and to the selected artists’ websites, presented in the order 
in which they are discussed in the book.27
robot art competition:
https://robotart.org/
reimagine ai / human impact Lab, The 
Climate Clock:
https://climateclock.net/
VoidLab, Shapeshifting AI:
https://vimeo.com/231779659/
Artistes et Robots at Grand palais exhibition 
page (archived):
https://www.grandpalais.fr/en/event/
artists-robots/
harold cohen, AARON:
http://aaronshome.com/
Leonel Moura, Robot Art:
http://www.leonelmoura.com/bebot_works/
156 (art) Gallery of Links
The Next Rembrandt:
https://www.nextrembrandt.com/
Gene Kogan, artist’s website:
http://genekogan.com/
Mike Tyka, artist’s website:
http://www.miketyka.com/
Mario Klingemann, artist’s website:
http://quasimondo.com/
Memo akten, Learning to See:
http://www.memo.tv/portfolio/learning-to-see/
Trevor paglen, It Began as a Military Experiment:
https://www.moma.org/collection/
works/275173/
Trevor paglen’s Sight Machine with Kronos Quartet 
and obscura digital:
https://vimeo.com/205149078/
aaron Koblin, The Sheep Market:
http://www.aaronkoblin.com/project/
the-sheep-market/
aaron Koblin, 10,000 Cents:
http://www.aaronkoblin.com/ project/ 
10000-cents/
Lauren Mccarthy, Lauren!
http://lauren-mccarthy.com/LaUren/
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Katja novitskova, If Only You Could See What I’ve 
Seen with Your Eyes
https://ifonlyyoucouldseewhativeseenwith-
youreyes.com/
pierre huyghe, UUmwelt:
https://www.serpentinegalleries.org/exhibi-
tions-events/pierre-huyghe-uumwelt/

notes
1 southern’s claim is not quite accurate. The 2016 software 
aiVa, which stands for ‘artificial intelligence Virtual artist’, 
is an electronic composer recognised by the French music 
royalties company saceM. in november 2016 aiVa released 
its classical music-inspired album Genesis.
2 competition announcement, https://consumer.huawei.com/
uk/campaign/sparkarenaissance/, accessed March 4, 2019.
3 in his essay ‘What is an author?’, originally written in 1969, 
an essay which has had a significant resonance in many areas 
of arts and humanities, Foucault suggests that
the ‘author-function’ is tied to the legal and institu-
tional systems that circumscribe, determine, and ar-
ticulate the realm of discourses; it does not operate in 
a uniform manner in all discourses, at all times, and in 
any given culture; it is not defined by the spontaneous 
attribution of a text to its creator, but through a series 
of precise and complex procedures; it does not refer, 
purely and simply, to an actual individual insofar as 
it simultaneously gives rise to a variety of egos and to 
a series of subjective positions that individuals of any 
class may come to occupy. (1992, 309)
4 Barrat goes so far as to claim that defining intelligence as 
something computable was shared by ‘every expert’ he spoke 
to (2013, 163).
5 The original idea for this chapter was developed in a short 
piece titled ‘Beyond heaven and hell: how to tell better sto-
ries about ai’, which i wrote for the online journal Immerse and 
which was published on March 29, 2018.
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6 i addressed the limitations of traditional moral theory with 
regard to current conceptual and technological developments 
in Bioethics in the Age of New Media (2009).
7 i developed this argument in The End of Man: A Feminist 
Counterapocalypse (2018).
8 For an interesting account of elemental media, which exam-
ines the foundational yet partly invisible elements such as wa-
ter, earth, fire and air that lie at the base of our habitat, while 
situating them in the wider context of media and communica-
tions theory due to their function as binding or, indeed, com-
municating, elements, see John durham peters, The Marvelous 
Clouds: Toward a Philosophy of Elemental Media (2015).
9 see http://www.humanimpactlab.com/the-rising-seas
10 This is part of an announcement that appeared on the 
Microsoft website, with the embedded quote coming from 
Microsoft director ron augustus, https://news.microsoft.
com/europe/features/next-rembrandt/
11 posting by Joseph rabie on January 21, 2018, 14:17, to a mod-
erated mailing list for net criticism <nettime>. subject: They 
know not what they do.
12 The argument presented in this section is partly borrowed 
and developed from my book Nonhuman Photography (2017, 77).
13 This is a paraphrase, for the purposes of my argument here, of 
the following statement: ‘the imagination of the camera is greater 
than that of every single photographer and that of all photographers 
put together’ (Flusser 2000, 30).
14 still and d’inverno’s proposal involves the following theses: 
‘adopt an n-creative approach to designing systems support-
ing being in the world; enhancing and supporting human cre-
ative activity in all of its forms (d’inverno and Mccormack, 
2015) [and…] Use human experience as the starting point for 
future system design (Yee-King and d’inverno, 2016)’ (2016).
15 as crawford and paglen explain,
datasets aren’t simply raw materials to feed algo-
rithms, but are political interventions. as such, much 
of the discussion around ‘bias’ in ai systems misses the 
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mark: there is no ‘neutral’, ‘natural’, or ‘apolitical’ van-
tage point that training data can be built upon. There 
is no easy technical ‘fix’ by shifting demographics, de-
leting offensive terms, or seeking equal representation 
by skin tone. The whole endeavor of collecting images, 
categorizing them, and labeling them is itself a form of 
politics, filled with questions about who gets to decide 
what images mean and what kinds of social and politi-
cal work those representations perform. (2019)
16 i am grateful to nick Thurston for this suggestion.
17 presentation by Fei-Fei Li at the imagenet 10th Birthday 
party event at The photographers’ Gallery in London on 
september 21, 2019.
18 as crawford and paglen explain,
imagenet became the basis for an annual competi-
tion where labs around the world would try to outper-
form each other by pitting their algorithms against 
the training set, and seeing which one could most ac-
curately label a subset of images. in 2012, a team from 
the University of Toronto used a convolutional neural 
network to handily win the top prize, bringing new 
attention to this technique. That moment is widely 
considered a turning point in the development of con-
temporary ai…. The final year of the imagenet com-
petition was 2017, and accuracy in classifying objects 
in the limited subset had risen from 71.8% to 97.3%. 
(crawford and paglen, 2019)
19 i had to reject 20% of the original tasks i had received because, 
contrary to the instructions, some participants had just used 
stock photos or because the download link to the image did 
not work, so i reopened the hiT to get up to a hundred images.
20 This idea of ethics comes emmanuel Levinas (1969, 1989). it of-
fers an alternative to deontological moral theories which are 
based on specific content (i.e., good that transcends Being in 
plato, the almighty and all-loving God in christianity). What 
Levinas proposes instead is a non-systemic ethics of relations 
which dispenses with a need for a content-based obligation, 
while at the same time retaining the sense of duty. This sense 
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of duty is premised on the concept of the obligation to the oth-
er, which precedes any of my wishes, desires and concepts – 
for the simple ontological reason that the other’s existence in 
the world precedes mine. see also my Bioethics in the Age of New 
Media (Zylinska 2009) for an attempt to extend Levinas’ ethi-
cal theory to the posthumanist context.
21 it is worth citing at length from Bishop here:
The perverse pleasures underlying these artistic ges-
tures offer an alternative form of knowledge about 
capitalism’s commodification of the individual, es-
pecially when both participants and viewers appear 
to enjoy the transgression of subordination to a work 
of art. if one is not to fall into the trap of merely con-
demning these works as reiterations of capitalist ex-
ploitation, it becomes essential to view art not as part 
of a seamless continuum with contemporary labor but 
as offering a specific space of experience where those 
norms are suspended and put in service of pleasure in 
perverse ways… . (2012, 111).
22 as artie Vierkant explains in his widely distributed pdf titled 
‘The image object post-internet’,
‘post-internet art’ is a term coined by artist Marisa 
olson and developed further by writer Gene Mchugh 
in the critical blog ‘post internet’ during its activity 
between december 2009 and september 2010. Under 
Mchugh’s definition it concerns ‘art responding to 
[a condition] described as “post internet” – when the 
internet is less a novelty and more a banality. perhaps 
... closer to what Guthrie Lonergan described as 
“internet aware” – or when the photo of the art object 
is more widely dispersed [&] viewed than the object 
itself’. There are also several references to the idea of 
‘post-net culture’ in the writings of Lev Manovich as 
early as 2001.
specifically within the context of this pdF, post-
internet is defined as a result of the contemporary mo-
ment: inherently informed by ubiquitous authorship, 
the development of attention as currency, the collapse 
of physical space in networked culture, and the infinite 
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reproducibility and mutability of digital materials. 
(Vierkant 2010)
23 The term ‘net art’ (aka net.art) is associated with art made in 
and for the internet, especially in its pre-platform capitalism 
days. net art was irreverent and critical in spirit – towards 
the medium itself but also towards the very institution of art, 
with its celebration of objects and markets. artists associ-
ated with the term included Vuk Ćosić, Jodi, Alexei Shulgin, 
olia Lialina, heath Bunting, natalie Bookchin and cornelia 
sollfrank. The rhizome and nettime listserves and ensuing 
communities have played a key role in net art’s development 
and recognition.
24 distancing or alienation effect.
25 For an exposition and critique of Manovich’s project of 
cultural analytics see Gary hall, Pirate Philosophy (2016, 43-55).
26 remarks made by the artist during a public conversa-
tion with hans Ulrich obrist at The serpentine Galleries, 
october 3, 2018.
27 all links correct at the time of writing (november 2019).
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Can computers be creative? Is AI art just a form of Candy Crush? AI Art: 
Machine Visions and Warped Dreams cuts through the smoke and mirrors 
surrounding the current narratives of computation, robotics and Artificial 
Intelligence. Offering a critique of the political underpinnings of AI and 
its dominant aesthetics, it raises broader questions about the conditions 
of art making, creativity and labour today.
Joanna Zylinska inscribes AI art into a vibrant media ecology, while 
deftly engaging pressing aesthetic and socio-political concerns. This 
provocative book asks us to question not only so-called machinic 
creativity but also, crucially, creativity in humans.
Professor Kate Mondloch, University of Oregon
An investigation into the conceptual, discursive and technological 
features of art in a historical perspective also implies asking what 
sorts of expectations of authorship have been pre-installed into 
our assumptions in the first place. This lucid book gives wonderful 
answers, updated questions as well as methodological suggestions. 
Machine-learning humans need to be better trained through datasets of 
cultural theory and history!
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